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ABSTRACT
While the working methods of the International Court of Justice have been criticized
in the past for their excessive slowness and formalism, the reforms introduced by the
Court in the past two decades have led to considerable improvement. Recently, the
‘clients’ of the Court have expressed paradoxical desires for the Court to be more as-
sertive in the management of the written and oral procedure and, at the same time,
more responsive to the procedural views of the parties. Moreover, there are many re-
quests for more interaction between the Bench and the parties and their counsel. If the
good administration of justice rests on a careful blend between, on the one hand, for-
malism and solemnity, and, on the other, ﬂexibility and dynamism, this cannot be
achieved at the expense of the equality of the parties or of the procedural predictability.
Hence, it may be desirable to amend the Rules in order to improve and modernize the
procedure.
1. INTRODUCTION
If there is one area where loyalty to tradition competes with the spirit of reform, it is
surely that of the working methods of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). An in-
stitution which is celebrating 70 years of experience in dispute resolution, in addition
to the 18 years of the Permanent Court of International Justice, can congratulate it-
self on the fact that its working methods have stood the test of time.
But the Court knows it must not rest on its laurels. Thus, it constantly monitors
the progress of cases, from the moment they are submitted to the point at which a
decision is reached, and it strives to adjust the process when it becomes too pro-
longed. It is doubly vigilant. First, the Court watches out for poor practice by liti-
gants, which it strives to nip in the bud. This is the main purpose of the Practice
Directions and the reason why they are regularly revised.1 Secondly, it pays close at-
tention to any criticism or suggestions, and endeavours to meet the expectations of
its direct subjects (States and international organizations2), the international commu-
nity as a whole and, finally, the small community of lawyers who gravitate around it.
The complexity of the task becomes apparent with the realization that these
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1 The first Practice Directions were adopted in October 2001. They were revised, or amended, in 2002,
2004, 2006, 2009 and 2013.
2 The present analysis deals only with contentious cases. Some of the topics may also be relevant to advisory
proceedings, but overall the latter have their own features, which warrant separate treatment.
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expectations may sometimes be contradictory, and that the particular interests of
some may clash with those of others, or even with the demands of the sound admin-
istration of justice.
The Court has, therefore, encouraged regular discussion of its working methods.
The 70th anniversary seminar is simply another step in that process, reflecting its be-
lief that the edifice is never complete. The tradition of seminars was instituted at the
time of the 50th anniversary, and was continued at the 60th.3 The focus at that time
was on issues of efficiency and on reforms which could enable the Court to save
time, without sacrificing the quality of its decision-making. The Court has shown it-
self to be sensitive to criticism regarding the slowness of its proceedings, and has
been receptive to some of the proposals put forward.4 It has thus accepted the need
to reduce the time limits for written proceedings and to examine several cases at the
same time, thus reducing the waiting time between when a case becomes ready for
hearing and the date when it is heard; in short, to better manage the judicial calen-
dar.5 It has, moreover, shortened deliberations during certain phases, for example, by
doing without judges’ notes for preliminary objections.6
These efforts have borne fruit and the Court has now fully cleared its backlog of
cases.7 Furthermore, timescales for processing new cases are generally no longer
than those of an arbitral tribunal. As shown in table 2 hereafter, ‘Length of proceed-
ings for cases introduced over the past ten years’, the average processing time for a
decision on the merits of a case is between three and four years, reduced by two-
thirds for preliminary objections. Any exceptions tend to be attributable to the par-
ties rather than to the Court itself, which has established a very acceptable ‘cruising
pace’, given the complexity of the cases submitted to it and of the issues at stake.
This is good news, and should be recognized as such from the outset.
The second piece of good news is that the Court now has sufficient financial and
human resources to fulfil its mission: in any event, addresses by the President to the
UN General Assembly no longer cite significant budget constraints or lack of staff.
While additional resources have enabled the Court to be more receptive to certain
3 See C Peck and R Lee, Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice: Proceedings of the ICJ/
UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Court (Kluwer Law International 1997) 101–
64, and ICJ/UNITAR, A Dialogue at the Court: Proceedings of the ICJ/UNITAR Colloquium Held on the
Occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the International Court of Justice (Peace Palace, 10 and 11 April 2006)
19–36.
4 See, in particular, the report by D Bowett and others (eds), The International Court of Justice: Process,
Practice and Procedure, British Institute of International and Comparative Law (1997); see also CN Brower
and others, ‘Process, Practice and Procedure of the International Court of Justice’ (1998) 92 Proceedings
of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 278–90.
5 See K Keith, ‘Challenges to the Independence of the International Judiciary’ (Chatham House, Transcript,
26 November 2014) 9 <https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/challenges-independence-international-ju
diciary> accessed 15 March 2016.
6 R Higgins, ‘Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight Courtroom’ (2001) 50(1) Intl & Comp LQ
123.
7 See General Assembly, Official Records, 65th Session, ICJ Rep (2009–2010) Suppl No 4, A/65/4, 7,
para 22; Speech by HE Judge Peter Tomka, President of the ICJ, to the 68th Session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations (31 October 2013).
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suggestions from litigants, and to step up its information campaigns,8 the funds allo-
cated by the General Assembly, although they remain modest in comparison to those
of other international jurisdictions,9 have enabled it to adopt a relatively relaxed atti-
tude to internal ‘housekeeping’.
This good news, however, does not mean that the Court can afford to become
complacent. And it appears to have no intention of doing so, judging from the topics
chosen for this seminar. But updating working methods is like maintaining a house:
there are some years when the very structure of the building needs work, while in
others it is just a question of patching up the cracks. The experience of the past 10
years has not revealed any alarming systemic weaknesses: we can, therefore, conclude
that the basic structure remains sound.
Recent cases have, however, revealed sensitive areas at each stage of the passage
through the Peace Palace of contentious proceedings, from filing of the application
to delivery of the judgment. They include removal of the case from the List at the
provisional measures stage, reduction in the number of written pleadings, manage-
ment of the oral proceedings and dealing with incidental proceedings. Some of these
issues are not new, and their persistence gives rise to doubts over the effectiveness of
measures adopted in the past to resolve them. Thus, the Court has long striven, un-
successfully, to limit the volume of written proceedings and to better manage the
oral proceedings. Despite several Practice Directions, little progress has been made
in these areas. These are potential cracks that require attention, and a number of pro-
posals have been made in this regard. They almost all advocate for bolder use of the
Court’s decision-making power over the conduct of the proceedings.
In the past, the Court has refrained from opposing the wishes of States, particu-
larly when both parties were of the same view. But this deference to State sover-
eignty appears to be lessening. The feeling of amazement previously described by
President Mohammed Bedjaoui in terms of ‘the astonishment of being judges in-
vested with the power to judge States, these untouchable monsters crowned with
sacrosanct sovereignty’,10 is gradually giving way to a more pragmatic approach, her-
alded by Dame Rosalyn Higgins in the 2000s: ‘One must focus on desired outcomes
and one must be transparent in all decision-making. There is no intangible “value-
added” to be built in to decisions, whether procedural or substantive, by virtue of the
fact that they concern sovereign States.’11
8 One should not underestimate the importance of information campaigns, given that ‘[in] a global commu-
nity, reluctance to have recourse to judicial settlement can only be overcome if States are familiar with the
activities of international jurisdictions’ [Author’s translation] (P Couvreur, ‘Aperc¸u du statut et des fonc-
tions du greffier de la Cour internationale de Justice’, in C Apostolidis (ed), Les arr^ets de la Cour internatio-
nale de Justice (Dijon 2005) 78.
9 Speech by HE Judge Peter Tomka, President of the International Court of Justice, to the 67th Session of
the General Assembly (1 November 2012): ‘the Member States’ award is less than 1%—exactly 0.8%—of
the Organization’s regular budget. By way of comparison, the Court’s revised budget for the biennium
201415 was US$51,403,100, or approximately e47 million, while the ITLOS budget was e18,886,200 for
the years 2015–16, and the ICC annual budget for 2015 was e130.67 million.
10 M Bedjaoui, ‘Le cinquantie`me anniversaire de la Cour internationale de Justice’ in Recueil des cours de
l’Acade´mie du droit international de La Haye (Nijhoff Publishers 1997) vol 257, 20.
11 R Higgins (n 6) 131.
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Many recent procedural decisions bear witness to this subtle change in attitude.
Although the Court still consults the parties on their procedural wishes, it departs
more readily from their views if it believes this is required in the interests of the
sound administration of justice. This principle, previously invoked to make good
lacunae in the Court’s statutory texts,12 now acts as an indicator for the adoption of
specific procedural measures. It enables the Court to find a balance between protect-
ing the parties’ procedural rights and the smooth operation of its own procedure, in
accordance with the rules laid down in the Statute and Rules of the Court.
Maintaining such a balance is a permanent challenge, which arises at each stage—
from institution of the proceedings, through management of the hearings and delib-
eration and ending with delivery of the judgment.
2. ENTRY ON AND REMOVAL FROM THE GENERAL
LIST: SIGNIFICANT ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS TO PRESERVE
STATE CONSENT
State consent plays a critical role in the initiation of judicial proceedings. That may
seem an obvious statement, but it has significant procedural consequences for the
introduction of cases.
A. Forum prorogatum and Entry on the List
Paragraph 5 of Article 38 of the Rules of the Court13 establishes the procedural re-
quirements for forum prorogatum where a State has not recognized the jurisdiction of
the Court when an application instituting proceedings is filed against it. It was
adopted as part of the 1978 revision both to protect the principle of State consent
and to ensure procedural economy. Before the revision, ‘the Court was . . . obliged
to enter in its General List “cases” for which it plainly did not have jurisdiction and
in which, therefore, no further action could be taken; it then had to issue orders so
as to remove them from its List’,14 sometimes long after the filing of the application.
Currently, if the case does not proceed, the application is not only ‘shelved with
no further action’, but the fact that the case is not entered on the List also means
that no official record is kept of the applicant State’s claims: all that remains of the
referral to the Court is the press release issued by the Registry on the day the appli-
cation was filed, which is soon lost in the constant flow of press releases. Such was
the fate of the applications filed by Rwanda against France,15 by Argentina against
12 See Permanent Court of International Justice, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (1924) Ser A, No 2,
16 (procedure to be followed in the event of an objection being taken in limine litis); adoption of provi-
sional measures: Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep 1986, 9, para 19.
13 It states:
‘5. When the applicant State proposes to found the jurisdiction of the Court upon a consent thereto
yet to be given or manifested by the State against which such application is made, the application shall
be transmitted to that State. It shall not however be entered in the General List, nor any action be taken
in the proceedings, unless and until the State against which such application is made consents to the
Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the case.’
14 Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France), ICJ Rep
2008, 204, para 63.
15 See Press Release No 2007/11, The Republic of Rwanda Applies to the International Court of Justice in a
Dispute with France (18 April 2007).
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the United States,16 and by the Marshall Islands against China, the United States,
the Russian Federation, France, Israel and the People’s Democratic Republic of
Korea, among others.17 It might be asked, however, whether international just-
ice would not be better served if a certain amount of publicity were given to such
applications, for example, through the creation of a separate section of the Court’s
website and in its publications, listing applications filed on the basis of forum
prorogatum and shelved without further action. In effect, the lodging of such an
application reflects both the existence of a dispute and the belief of the
applicant State that negotiations have failed. Publicizing the application and, any
resultant public reactions, could help in gaining acceptance of the Court’s
jurisdiction.
B. Discontinuance and Removal from the List
Discontinuance by the parties, which leads to the case being removed from the List,
does not usually raise any particular difficulties in terms of protection of the principle
of State consent, as the relatively significant number of removals which have taken
place over the past 10 years has demonstrated.18 The only disruption is to the
Court’s schedule, if the case is discontinued at a late stage of the proceedings. In this
respect, the Rules are indeed permissive, and enable the parties to reach a settlement
at any time before final judgment on the merits of the case.19 This has occurred on
two occasions—in Timor-Leste v Australia and in Ecuador v Colombia,20 in both of
which discontinuance occurred shortly before the scheduled hearing date. The
Court, however, takes no offence and prefers to stress the complementary relation-
ship between the judicial process and a negotiated settlement: ‘When giving notice
of discontinuance and agreeing to it, both Parties praised the Court for the time, re-
sources and energy it had devoted to the case and acknowledged that reaching a
settlement would have been difficult, if not impossible, but for the involvement of
the Court.’21
However, removal from the List can be genuinely problematic in two situations.
The first is where internal political rivalries extend to the courtroom. The Court
strives, often successfully, to preserve its independence and to maintain a healthy
16 See Press Release No 2014/25, The Argentine Republic Seeks to Institute Proceedings Against the United
States of America Before the International Court of Justice. It Requests US to Accept the Court’s Jurisdiction
(7 August 2014).
17 See Press Release No 2014/18, The Republic of the Marshall Islands Files Applications Against Nine States
for Their Alleged Failure to Fulfil their Obligations with Respect to the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race at
an Early Date and to Nuclear Disarmament (25 April 2014).
18 See Table 1 hereafter: Contentious cases.
19 There is, however, a slight difference between the situation where a request for discontinuance is made
jointly—in that case the parties can inform the Court ‘at any time before the final judgment on the mer-
its’ (art 88 of the Rules)—and the situation where only the applicant makes such request—in that case,
art 89 of the Rules protects the respondent which ‘has already taken some step in the proceedings’, by
providing that ‘the Court shall fix a timelimit within which the respondent may state whether it opposes
the discontinuance of the proceedings’.
20 See also address by HE Judge Shi Jiuyong, ‘The internal working practice of the International Court of
Justice’, 6th Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (28 October 2005) 3.
21 K Keith (n 5) 8.
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distance in this regard. But these rivalries are sometimes reflected in the appointment
of two agents, whose procedural actions are mutually contradictory, such as, for ex-
ample, statements both of discontinuance and of continuance of the proceedings.
Doubts as to the authority of State representatives lead to doubts as to the validity of
their procedural actions. This happened in the Genocide case (Bosnia v Serbia),22 and
also in Honduras v Brazil. In the former, after noting that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina
had not demonstrated its will to withdraw the Application in an unequivocal man-
ner’,23 the Court concluded that there had been no discontinuance. By contrast, in
Honduras v Brazil, the case was entered on the List only after some delay, pending
clarification of the internal situation,24 and the President adopted an Order for re-
moval of the List only when all doubts as to the authority of the State representatives
had been dispelled.25
Table 1. Contentious Casesa
Year Cases referred to the Court Judgments Ordersb Removal from list
2015 0 3 1 1
2014 5 2 1
2013 4 2 5 1
2012 0 4
2011 2 4 3 1
2010 3 2 1 2
2009 3 3 1
2008 6 3 2
2007 0 3 1
2006 3 1 1 1
2005 1 3
Total 27 30 16 6
Within this time period, the Court delivered two advisory opinions :
- Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in re-
spect of Kosovo
- Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2012, Judgment No 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour
Organization upon a Complaint Filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development
aThe tables do not take into account judicial developments posterior to 15 January 2016.
bThe ﬁgures do not include the procedural orders (ﬁxing of time limits, designation of experts, joinder of cases, etc.)
22 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2007, 5254, paras 1824.
23 ibid 54, para 25.
24 The case regarding Certain Questions concerning Diplomatic Relations has the No 147 on the General List,
whereas Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Belgium v Switzerland)
has No 145, even though the Application was filed after that by Honduras.
25 See Certain Questions Concerning Diplomatic Relations (Honduras v Brazil), Order of 12 May 2010, ICJ
Rep 2010, 303. See Annual Report of the ICJ (2009–10), UN Doc A/65/4, paras 14–15 and 88–89; ad-
dress by HE Judge Hisashi Owada, President of the International Court of Justice, to the 65th Session of
the General Assembly of the United Nations (28 October 2010) 7.
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Another difficulty emerges in the case of removal from the List on grounds of
manifest lack of jurisdiction. The Rules do not set out any specific procedure.26 The
closest alternative is removal at the provisional measures stage, which the Court
ordered in the Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v United States of America) and
(Yugoslavia v Spain).27 The solution is reached after adversarial proceedings, and
decided on by the Court as a whole, by means of a judicial act (rather than a purely
administrative one). However, this still raises questions:
• there is no provision for this either in the Statute or in the Rules.28 The Court,
therefore, exercises this power praeter legem;
• in its jurisprudence, the Court fails to explain clearly the conditions governing re-
moval for manifest lack of jurisdiction29;
• in principle, ‘the provisional conclusion [in the provisional measures order] is with-
out prejudice to the Court’s definitive decision on the question of whether it has
jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case’.30 It is difficult to reconcile this
statement, albeit well founded,31 with a decision to remove a case for manifest
lack of jurisdiction;
• what if there was no request for the indication of provisional measures? Curiously,
protection of the principle of the respondent’s consent then becomes dependent
upon a procedural act by the applicant. This cannot be the role of provisional
measures.
3 . SOUND PROCEDURAL MANAGEMENT: A QUICK COMPARISON
BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
One of the main differences between permanent courts and arbitral tribunals lies in
the existence, in the case of the former, of a predetermined procedural framework
within which the parties’ case is heard. Nonetheless, the strictly Court-directed
model set out in the Statute, which attributes virtually no role to the parties, has
been significantly supplemented and refined by the Rules, which accord the parties
an important role in the conduct of the proceedings,32 thus reducing the gap
26 See S Yee, ‘A Proposal for Formalizing the “No Case Exists” Objections Procedure at the International
Court of Justice’ (2005) 4(2) Chinese JIL 393.
27 See Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v Spain), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, ICJ Rep
1999 (II), 761; and Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v United States of America), Provisional Measures,
Order of 2 June 1999, ICJ Rep 1999 (II), 916.
28 See Legality of Use of Force, Declaration of Judge Parra-Aranguren, ICJ Rep 1999, 950, para 4.
29 A request for removal from the list was rejected by the Court in the Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand),
Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, ICJ Rep 2011, 543, para 31 and 555, para 69.
30 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Rep 2011, 124, para 129.
31 See also Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals, where the Court adopted provisional measures before deciding that it did not
have jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the case.
32 No fewer than 19 articles of the Rules (17, 31, 35, 36, 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 55, 58, 59, 63, 79, 80, 88, 89, 91,
92) provide for consultation with the parties on procedural issues. Moreover, and very generally, art 31 states
that ‘[i]n every case submitted to the Court, the President shall ascertain the views of the parties with regard
to questions of procedure. For this purpose, he shall summon the agents of the parties to meet him as soon
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between judicial settlement and arbitration. In practice, this trend towards ‘arbitrali-
zation’ became even more pronounced, in that, far from confining itself to a simple
consultation of the parties, the Court had long tended to accept their procedural
wishes. It was this sort of deference which Judge Higgins openly deplored.33
In recent practice, the Court has shown itself to be more prescriptive, and no lon-
ger accedes to all the requests of the parties. Overall, this trend has been welcomed,
and since it echoes the wishes expressed by the States and their counsel to see the
Court exercising greater control over the proceeding, particularly during the oral
phase.34 There remain some areas, however, where the Court continues to prefer
guidance to prescription.
A. Constitution of a Chamber
The norm is that cases are heard by the full Court35; and this is effectively what hap-
pens in practice. The Statute nonetheless envisages the constitution of three types of
chambers: by category of subject matter,36 by summary procedure37 and on an ad
hoc basis.38
Ad hoc chambers have been used sporadically, but certainly more often than pre-
constituted chambers, which have never been used. The last time an ad hoc chamber
of the ICJ was formed was in 2002 (Special Agreement between Benin and Niger),
while International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) formed its first ad hoc
chamber in 2015, for the Ghana/Coˆte d’Ivoire case. The constitution of ad hoc cham-
bers enables States to choose the members of the bench, while benefiting from the
authority of decisions of the Court or of ITLOS, from their procedural experience,
and from the material advantages offered by a permanent institution. The contrast
with non-use of the summary procedure and the subject matter chamber, whose
composition is predetermined, is striking. Ad hoc chambers thus also illustrate the
‘arbitralization’ of the judicial process: the constitution of chambers enables the par-
ties to determine the composition of the bench, in which, in principle, they otherwise
as possible after their appointment, and whenever necessary thereafter’ and art 101: ‘[t]he parties to a case
may jointly propose particular modifications or additions to the rules contained in the present Part (with the
exception of Articles 93 to 97 inclusive), which may be applied by the Court or by a Chamber if the Court
or Chamber considers them appropriate in the circumstances of the case.’ Last but not least, Practice
Direction XIII seeks to simplify procedural formalities by enabling States Parties to come to agreement on
future procedural issues and to inform the Court in writing or by video conference:
‘The reference in art 31 of the Rules of Court to ascertaining the views of the parties with regard
to questions of procedure is to be understood as follows:
After the initial meeting with the President, and in the context of any further ascertainment of the
parties’ views relating to questions of procedure, the parties may, should they agree on the pro-
cedure to be followed, inform the President by letter accordingly.
The views of the parties as to the future procedure may also, should they agree, be ascertained by
means of a video or telephone conference.’
33 See R Higgins (n 6).
34 See the numerous suggestions relating to pleadings in Counsel Survey.
35 Art 25, para 1, of the Statute.
36 Art 26, para 1, of the Statute.
37 Art 29 of the Statute.
38 Art 26, para 2, of the Statute.
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have no say other than through the nomination of an ad hoc judge.39 However, it
should be borne in mind that ‘chambers make it harder to implement the fundamen-
tal principle of equality between the world’s “principal legal systems” and the “main
forms of civilization” (Article 9 of the Statute) when it comes to the composition of
the bench’.40 The composition of chambers—particularly those of the Court—also
shows that judges are often chosen on the basis of regional and cultural affinity. This
may be a good or a bad thing: it is perhaps the price to be paid to keep certain cases
within the institutional remit.
B. Management of the Written Pleadings
The volume of written proceedings. Despite the adoption of Practice Directions, the
volume of written pleadings, in particular the annexes, remains excessive. Cases
involving environmental protection issues are particularly voluminous and dense,
which creates problems in terms of both management and evaluation. It would in-
deed be of interest to know the documentary volume of certain cases.41 Far from
wanting to add to the workload of the Registry, it is suggested that, if for any reason
these figures already existed, their publication would make the public more aware of
the efforts required of the Court and its administrative staff.
This documentary excess is a particular source of frustration for the Court, and it
is the parties who are responsible for it. And in practice it may even prove counter-
productive. It is certainly unreasonable to expect the judges to sift out what is rele-
vant, if the parties’ legal teams have previously failed to exercise discretion in the se-
lection of documents. The second problem arises from the need for translation: to
avoid translating this mass of documentation, the Registry has to make a selection.
However, in the absence of predetermined criteria, the Registry is always at risk of
accusations of bias in its selection.
This brings us back to a recurring, broader question: that of bilingualism. The
value of maintaining this tradition may be contested, but its underlying merits are all
too often overlooked by those who simply focus on the workload it involves and the
delays it can cause to the proceedings. However, bilingualism does present a certain
attraction for French-speaking States: this is one of the reasons why the permanent
jurisdictions are sometimes preferred to arbitration. Moreover, it is the symbol—al-
beit an imperfect one—of the diversity of legal traditions, which explains the cultural
and linguistic diversity sought in the constitution of the parties’ legal teams. Above
39 See the partially veiled criticism of Judges Oda, Morozov and El-Khani in their opinions in Delimitation of
the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Constitution of
Chamber, Order of 20 January 1982, ICJ Rep 1982, 11–12.
40 The Registry of the ICJ, The International Court of Justice Handbook (6th edn, 2014) 328, 28 <http://
www.icj-cij.org/publications/en/manuel_en.pdf> accessed 15 March 2016.
41 In a public lecture, Judge Keith gave the following astonishing figures for the Aerial Herbicide Spraying
case (Ecuador v Colombia):
‘The 18 volumes include 12,294 pages and about 90 scientific and technical reports. There was exten-
sive evidence relating to the composition of the herbicide, the patterns and places of spraying, the winds
at the time of spraying, the toxic effect of the herbicide and the health status of humans, animals and
plants before and after. There were eyewitness accounts and expert reports of various kinds.’ (Keith
(n 5) 8)
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all, it has the advantage of providing a control language, both during deliberation and
in the drafting of orders and judgments. From this point of view, bilingualism is one
of the factors which contribute to maintaining the stylistic quality of the Court’s deci-
sions. Nonetheless, despite these advantages of bilingualism, translations of written
pleadings are not made public. And while the parties sometimes ask the Registry for
copies, they are not distributed beyond this limited circle. Is it not a pity, for ex-
ample, that the non-French-speaking world cannot enjoy full access to the parties’
pleadings in the Diallo case?
It should, moreover, be recalled that the Statute and Rules also provide for the
possibility of using a non-official language42 but, other than a counsel for Libya, who
employed it in the case of the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie to speak in Arabic, this op-
tion has barely been used by States.43
Number of rounds of written proceedings. Both the Statute (in Article 43, paragraph
2) and the Rules (in Article 45, paragraph 1) provide that the written pleadings in-
clude a memorial by the applicant and a counter-memorial by the respondent. The
principle of a single exchange of written pleadings is thus established. A second
round is optional—at least that is what is suggested by the use of the expression ‘if
necessary’ in the Statute and the verb ‘may’ in the Rules.44 It is for the Court to au-
thorize or direct that there should be a second round ‘if the parties are so agreed or
if the Court decides, proprio motu, or at the request of one of the parties, that these
pleadings are necessary’.45 The Court thus retains the power to decide on the need
for a second round. So much for the theory. In practice, authorization of a reply and
a rejoinder has not only become general practice,46 but the Court furthermore con-
siders itself bound to follow the wishes of the parties. The situation differs only for
preliminary objections, where the principle of a single round is now well estab-
lished,47 as is the time given to the applicant State to submit its observations in
response—in principle four months.48
This generalized practice of two rounds of written pleadings is one of the main
reasons for the length of proceedings; it leads to significant extra costs, resulting in
particular from preparation of these additional pleadings. The essential question is
not, however, about the time or resources which would be saved by limiting the writ-
ten pleadings; it is about whether this limitation would be prejudicial to the parties’
42 Art 39, para 3, of the Statute and art 51 of the Rules.
43 It was used more often during the PCIJ period: see S.S. ‘Wimbledon’ case and Rights of Minorities in Upper
Silesia case—German; Borchgrave and Barcelona Traction—Spanish (ICJ Handbook (n 40) 54).
44 ‘It is clear from the Rules that the Memorial and Counter-Memorial are entitlements; and there may be a
reply and a rejoinder, by right if the parties agree, or otherwise at the Court’s discretion or proprio motu.
Once a third round is allowed by the Court, then the fourth round, the rejoinder, in a sense follows auto-
matically, because otherwise there will not be a parity of pleading rounds between the Applicant and the
Respondent.’ (R Higgins (n 6) 125). See also Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand
Intervening), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2014, Separate Opinion of Judge Greenwood, 418–19, paras 32–35.
45 Art 45, para 2, of the Rules.
46 ICJ Handbook (n 40) 51.
47 In Spain v Canada and Pakistan v India, the Court so decided, contrary to the wishes of both Parties (see
R Higgins (n 6) 125).
48 See Practice Direction V.
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presentation of their legal position and the Court’s consideration of the case.49
While the reply and rejoinder undoubtedly help to clarify the argument, it would ap-
pear that this can often be done equally well at the oral phase, and this would have
the additional benefit of making the oral pleadings less repetitive.50
Recent cases have given the Court the opportunity partially to reconsider this
general practice of four written pleadings: when the parties are in agreement on a
single round, the Court will confirm their choice.51 But if the two parties express
opposing wishes, then the Court must exercise real procedural decision-making
power. Thus, in Whaling in the Antarctic,52 the Court felt it was sufficiently informed
of the factual and legal resources upon which the parties founded their positions and
decided that a second round of written pleadings was unnecessary.
This decision was contested by Japan. Judge Greenwood, therefore, considered it
appropriate to justify it in his Separate Opinion. Three guiding principles emerge
from his analysis: first, a second round should not be automatic53; secondly, a single
round should be sufficient in principle54; thirdly, ‘it must always be open to the
Court to order a second round of written pleadings if the Court decides that this is
necessary’.55
However, this significant procedural decision remains largely a matter for the ap-
plicant’s judgment, which may be a source of inequality between the parties. Judge
Greenwood, too, reserves an important role for the applicant’s wishes: he considers
that applicants should have the possibility of refining their reasoning, in response to
the arguments deployed by respondents in their counter-memorial.56 However, this
49 The Handbook published by the Registry is clearly in favour of two series of exchanges, on the grounds
that ‘the combination of a relatively lengthy written phase followed by a quite short oral one, as required
by the Statute, is highly desirable if the Court is to reach its decision on a fully informed basis. It provides
both the parties and the Court with the safeguards required for the sound administration of international
justice.’ (ICJ Handbook (n 40) 51)
50 ‘Reading these pleadings, my sense overall is that the third and fourth rounds are usually, to use two cli-
che´s, but apposite cliche´s nonetheless, arguments that are gilding the lily on the one hand and make-
weights on the other. I do believe that virtually everything in them could be — and really should be —
dealt with in oral argument. Instead, we allow these extra rounds and then complain that in the oral argu-
ments that follow later we are hearing nothing that we did not already know. I would like the Court to
make these further pleadings, beyond the Memorial and Counter-Memorial, the exception rather than
the norm. That would contribute greatly to dealing faster with cases, from beginning to end, than is pres-
ently the case. But for the moment the thinking is that if sovereign States wish to put further arguments
to us, it is difficult to refuse their request.’ (R Higgins (n 6) 125)
51 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2012,
427, para 8 and Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (n 14) 182, para 9.
52 In Whaling in the Antarctic (n 44) 235, para 6.
53 ibid, Separate Opinion of Judge Greenwood, 418–19, para 33.
54 ibid, para 35.
55 ibid, para 34.
56 ‘Lastly, there is, in my view, a distinction between the Applicant and the Respondent when the Court
comes to consider whether to accede to a request for a second round made by one party but opposed by
the other. The first round of written pleadings closes with the Counter Memorial. That document will
usually be the first indication which the Applicant receives of the Respondent’s case. It may raise matters
which the Applicant has not considered, or evidence which the Applicant needs the opportunity to refute.
There is, therefore, a strong case for ordering a second round of written pleadings when the Applicant so
requests; not to do so may occasion serious injustice if the Applicant is denied the opportunity to re-
spond to evidence or argument raised by the Respondent in the Counter Memorial. By contrast, when
Working Methods of the Court  385







justification is not entirely convincing, insofar as the parties do not usually reveal
their respective claims in the written pleadings, particularly if the dispute has been
the subject of prior negotiations. For the respondent, the second round provides
extra time to assemble factual evidence. From this standpoint, the option of a single
round could prove problematic, considering that applicants have had several months
or even years to prepare, before instituting proceedings. This is not necessarily the
case for respondents (in particular where the two parties have been negotiating and
the judicial option was neither envisaged nor envisageable; or if the internal situation
in one of the States does not permit effective archival research).
In short, the principle of a single round and the Court’s decision-making power
on this matter cannot in themselves be criticized; on the contrary. What is open to
criticism is the surprise effect of such a decision, inasmuch as it departs from the gen-
eral practice, as well as the advantage it gives to applicants. The way to make it more
acceptable would be to establish a general principle regarding the number of written
pleadings. Perhaps, the issue should be discussed more openly during the first pro-
cedural meeting between the President and the parties, when a commitment of prin-
ciple for one or two rounds should be taken. Following the filing of the counter-
memorial, the party requesting a second round—whether it be the applicant or the
respondent—would have to justify the need for this, and on this basis the Court or
the President would decide whether it was appropriate.
If the Court were to normalize the practice of a single round of written proceed-
ings, it is possible that the parties would ask more often to be allowed to introduce
evidence after the written procedure had closed. While the requirement of strict
compliance with Article 56 of the Rules (relating to the production of further docu-
ments) is understandable following four pieces of written pleadings, after only two
pieces it would be possible to envisage the introduction into the debate of additional
documents. However, permission to do so must preserve the adversarial principle:
while new documents might exceptionally be accepted, on the condition that they
were sent within a reasonable time before the start of the oral proceedings, their im-
proper introduction during the oral argument would be potentially damaging to the
interests of the other party.57 Consequently, the care which the Registry gives to
the Respondent prepares its Counter Memorial, it has the benefit of having seen both the Application
and the Memorial. It has a duty to set out its case in response in full in the Counter Memorial. If, having
seen the Counter Memorial, the Applicant considers that it does not need a second round of written
pleading, it is difficult to see on what grounds the Respondent can claim to need such a second round. It
has already had the last word and no injustice is done by denying it the opportunity to rehearse or add to
its case.’ (ibid, para 36)
57 ‘And in the East Timor case both parties presented documents after the closure of the written pleadings.
One of those — a PortugueseMoroccan Treaty — was produced by Australia during the oral argument,
indeed ‘sprung’, in best TV courtroom drama style, upon an unsuspecting Portuguese legal team, and
legal argument advanced on it. I am able to attest to this, as I was then one of the discomfited Portuguese
team. Formal objection was made by Portugal to this late introduction of a document, and the Court,
after in camera deliberation, decided not to admit the document to the record. But the damage was al-
ready done; and it was one of those rare cases where a single document (of which the Portuguese legal
team until that moment was totally unaware) had a very real psychological impact, regardless of whether
it was formally admitted into the record or not.’ (Higgins (n 6) 130). See also ITLOS, Dispute Concerning
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Coˆte
d’Ivoire), public sitting (30 March 2015), ITLOS /PV.15/A23/4, 6, lines 33–40.
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ensuring the application of Practice Direction IXbis is very well welcomed.
However, the terms in which this Direction is framed are less felicitous: the exces-
sively detailed language obscures the principles which inspire it. Moreover, in the
Internet age, it is perhaps desirable to review the definition of the concept of ‘easily
accessible’, enabling the parties to cite a document found on an institutional web-
site, which may have been posted there just a short time before the opening of the
hearings.
C. Conduct of the Hearings
In the Counsel Survey, many respondents spoke in favour of a more dynamic con-
duct of the hearings58 and less-repetitive speeches. This is a wish shared by the
judges, the parties and their counsel; and doubtless also by members of the public at-
tending or following the proceedings. It is true that hearings in the Great Hall of
Justice are not criminal trials, but more interaction between the bench and the bar
would in no way detract from the solemnity of the courtroom, while greater em-
phasis on brevity rather than repetition would encourage a better presentation of the
arguments.
The Court relies on counsel to do this. Article 60, paragraph 1, of the Rules and
Practice Direction No VI are aimed at improving the flow of hearings. Some judges
have encouraged counsel to be less professorial, to favour concision over length and
the concrete to the abstract.59 Proposals have been made to further reduce the
length of hearings (in terms of number of hours), while leaving the parties more
time to prepare a response, in particular during the second round. This would be an
effective way of encouraging litigants to condense their speeches and avoid
irrelevance.
Counsel, by contrast, look to the Court. The Court has responded by adopting
the practice of addressing questions to the parties during the hearings, more recently
asking them to integrate their replies into their speeches, rather than providing a later
written response, as was the case in the past. And this development has been wel-
comed. But why wait for the hearings to address certain questions to the parties?
Why not, instead, make full use of the possibilities offered by Article 61 of the Rules?
Its first paragraph states that ‘[t]he Court may, at any time prior to or during
the hearing, indicate any points or issues to which it would like the parties specially
to address themselves, or on which it considers that there has been sufficient argu-
ment.’ Indeed, some proposals seek interaction between Court and parties even be-
fore the start of the hearing: the Court could identify and put to the parties ‘any
issue on which it would like further explanation or clarification during the
hearings’.60 It is interesting to note that, among counsel consulted for the Counsel
Survey, many said they were in favour of this option, whether they came from the
58 See Counsel Survey.
59 Sir Robert Jennings, ‘The Work of the International Bar’, in Vohrah and others (eds), Man’s Inhumanity
to Man: Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Kluwer Law International 2003) 456–
58.
60 Address by President Tomka, to the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly, ICJ Rep 2014, A/69/
PV.33.
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continental tradition or from common law, whether academics or professional advo-
cates. It is thus a preference that goes beyond traditional divisions.
The questions before the hearings would be an excellent way to focus discussions
on points of interest to the judges and to submit to adversarial debate any questions
of law or of fact which they considered to be important.61 They depend, however, on
the Court consistently holding the deliberation provided for in Article 1 of the
Resolution concerning the Internal Judicial Practice of the Court. The organization
of this deliberation in the Whaling case, and also in Costa Rica v Nicaragua case,
clearly made the hearings more dynamic than usual, thanks to the questions which
several judges addressed to the parties and the experts. The President, Judge Tomka,
stated that ‘it is a procedure that is particularly useful in cases with major scientific
content, or where the factual background is a particularly complex one’.62 It may be
true, but why confine this deliberation to complex cases or those of a scientific
nature?
D. Dealing with Incidental Proceedings
If one had to isolate a single cause for disruption of the judicial process, incidental
proceedings would be the prime candidate.63 The proliferation of inter partes proced-
ural incidents—provisional measures, preliminary objections, counter-claims—as
well as requests for intervention by a third party, delays the procedure, can lead to
significant additional costs64 and can even sour the atmosphere between the parties.
Obviously, inappropriate use of such proceedings, as a procedural tactic far removed
from their original purpose, is a cause for concern.65 What are the means at the
Court’s disposal to prevent abuse?
The Court has reacted to the proliferation of incidental proceedings either by revi-
sing the Rules or by taking a tougher line in its decisions, tightening up procedural or
substantive requirements. Thus, revision of Article 79 of the Rules in 2001—which
gives the respondent three months following filing of the Memorial to raise prelimin-
ary objections—has cut down on delays. Revision of Article 80 on counter-claims,
which retains the right of the other Party to submit its views in writing on the admissi-
bility of such claims, has not, however, achieved its aim. As the most recent cases have
demonstrated, the criteria for admissibility are still far from clear.66
61 As Sir Robert Jennings observed: ‘It is useful for counsel to know at that point which way the judge seems
to be thinking than to be able only to make a guess too late when the final decision of the Court is
handed down.’ (Jennings (n 59) 464)
62 Address by President Peter Tomka to the General Assembly, A/69/PV.33; see also Keith (n 5) 8–9.
63 See Table 3 below. Incidental proceedings.
64 For some concrete examples, see A Miron, ‘Le cou^t de la justice internationale. Enque^te sur les aspects fi-
nanciers du contentieux intere´tatique’, in Annuaire franc¸ais du droit international, vol LX (2014), 18.
65 See also J Crawford, ‘Anglo-American and Continental Traditions in Advocacy before International
Courts and Tribunals’ (with A Pellet and C Redgwell) (2013) 2(4) Cambridge J Intl & Comp L 16.
66 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua); Construction of a
Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April
2013, ICJ Rep 2013, Declaration of Judge ad hoc Guillaume, 217, para 3; Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State (Germany v Italy), Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010, ICJ Rep 2010, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Canc¸ado Trindade, 334.
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Joinder of cases: the current approach is moving towards greater control of these
decisions by the Court itself.67 While in the past the Court has refrained from joining
cases where this was not acceptable to both parties,68 it is now less reluctant to im-
pose its decision when it is convinced that the sound administration of justice and
the principle of judicial economy69 so require. However, the circumstances in which
joinder of cases has taken place in the past have shown considerable variation—for
example, where the parties’ claims have overlapped,70 or in the case of counter-
claims,71 or when several applicants are in the same interest.72
Clarification of the conditions for the joinder of cases in the event of multiple ap-
plicants or respondents would have the advantage of leading the Court to better de-
fine the concept of ‘same interest’. This would help maintain the equality of the
parties, inasmuch as States in the same interest would lose the right to choose an ad
hoc judge if a permanent member of the Court held the nationality of one of them.73
The issue had already arisen in the Lockerbie cases, where the Court, having declined
to join the cases, authorized the United Kingdom to appoint Sir Robert Jennings as
judge ad hoc, even though an American judge, former President Schwebel, was sitting
in the case.74 This debatable solution differed from that adopted in the cases con-
cerning the Legality of the Use of Force, where ad hoc judges from the respondent
States were appointed at the provisional measures stage, but not in the later prelimin-
ary objections phase.75
67 The PCIJ formally joined cases in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, in Legal Status of the
South-Eastern Territory of Greenland and in Appeals from Certain Judgments of the Hungaro/Czechoslovak
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. The ICJ joined cases in South West Africa, North Sea Continental Shelf and
Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and with the
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica).
68 See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, ICJ Rep 1998, 115.
69 There is an explicit reference to these principles in Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan
River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica), Joinder of Proceedings, Order of 17 April 2013, ICJ Rep 2013, 184,
paras 12–18. Costa Rica showed little enthusiasm for the joinder.
70 See Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland, where Denmark and Norway filed
Applications on the same day. For more details, see D Akande, ‘Provisional Measures and Joinder of
Cases at the International Court of Justice – The Answers’ (EJIL: Talk, 18 January 2016) <http://www.
ejiltalk.org/tag/joinder/> accessed 15 March 2016.
71 See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica).
72 See South West Africa and North Sea Continental Shelf.
73 Art 31, para 5 of the Statute: ‘[s]hould there be several parties in the same interest, they shall, for the pur-
pose of the preceding provisions, be reckoned as one party only. Any doubt upon this point shall be set-
tled by the decision of the Court’; Art. 36, para. 1, of the Rules: ‘If the Court finds that two or more
parties are in the same interest, and therefore are to be reckoned as one party only, and that there is no
Member of the Court of the nationality of any one of those parties upon the Bench, the Court shall fix a
time-limit within which they may jointly choose a judge ad hoc.’
74 See A Ollivier, ‘Chronique de la Cour internationale de Justice’ (2003) 16(2) Revue que´be´coise de droit
international 237, fn 10; see also Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of
America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Rep 1998, Joint Declaration of Judges Bedjaoui,
Guillaume and Ranjeva, 32–45.
75 Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Rep
2004, 287, para 18.
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A similar problem arose in the case of Whaling in the Antarctic: the Court author-
ized Australia to appoint an ad hoc judge, even though the bench included a judge of
New Zealand nationality, on account that ‘intervention under Article 64 of the
Statute . . . cannot affect the equality of the parties to the dispute’.76 This statement
might have benefited from further justification,77 particularly since until then only
non-party interventions had been admitted by the Court, on the basis either of
Article 63 of the Statute78 or of Article 62, paragraph 1.79 Notwithstanding the ‘same
interest’ aspect, intervention as a non-party continues to raise difficulties, insofar as
the intervening State enjoys certain procedural rights.
Thus, intervention indirectly affects the composition of the bench. If New
Zealand had intervened as a party, Australia would have lost its right to appoint an
ad hoc judge. As Judge Guillaume has put it:
While it is true that the texts give States the right to appoint a judge . . ., that
right derives from a still more fundamental principle, that of equality of the
parties. However, in certain cases, such equality may be compromised by
the appointment of a judge ad hoc. This is the case where a State acting in the
same interest as other States already has a judge on the bench. In these circum-
stances, the statutory right to appoint a judge ad hoc loses its raison d’^etre, and
the equality principle requires that no judge ad hoc be appointed.80 [Author’s
translation.]
Intervention also affects the course of proceedings: thus, as the Rules currently
stand, the time limit for the filing of a request for intervention under Article 62 is
‘the closure of the written proceedings’,81 while for an application under Article 63,
the deadline is the ‘date fixed for the opening of the oral proceedings’.82 If requests
for intervention are submitted at an advanced stage of the proceedings—and this is
often the case—they disrupt the latter’s smooth running, because the parties need to
76 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of
6 February 2013, ICJ Rep 2013, 9, para 18. Para 21 of the Order peremptorily dismisses the possibility of
regarding the Applicant and the intervening State as being ‘Parties in the same interest’:
‘21. Whereas the question of the participation in the case of the judge ad hoc chosen by Australia was
referred to by the Respondent in the context of the latter’s discussion of the equality of the Parties be-
fore the Court; whereas the Court considers that it must make clear in the present Order that, since the
intervention of New Zealand does not confer upon it the status of party to the proceedings, Australia
and New Zealand cannot be regarded as being ‘parties in the same interest’ within the meaning of
Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute; whereas, consequently, the presence on the Bench of a judge of
the nationality of the intervening State has no effect on the right of the judge ad hoc chosen by the
Applicant to sit in the case pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute.’
77 See Declaration of Judge Owada, Whaling in the Antarctic (ibid) 11–12, paras 1 and 3.
78 Poland in the S.S. Wimbledon case, Cuba in the Haya de la Torre case and New Zealand in the Whaling in
the Antarctic case.
79 Equatorial Guinea in Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria)
and Greece in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy).
80 G Guillaume, ‘La ‘cause commune’ devant la Cour internationale de Justice’, in Liber amicorum judge
Mohammed Bedjaoui, reproduced in La Cour internationale de Justice a l’aube du XXIe`me sie`cle. Le regard
d’un juge, Pedone, 2003, 140.
81 Art 81, para 1, of the Rules of Court.
82 Art 82, para 1, of the Rules of Court.
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adapt their arguments to those of the intervening State. In addition, the speaking
time for the intervening State is added to that of the parties, which is in itself divided
into equal parts, while the arguments of the intervening State very often tend to sup-
port those of one of the parties.
The idea is not to restrict this form of access to the Court, but to clarify its pro-
cedural conditions in such a way that equality between the parties can be preserved
as far as possible. The Court must ensure this even more rigorously when it rules on
the admissibility of requests for intervention on the basis of written arguments
alone.83 A redefinition of the concept of ‘parties in the same interest’ and a stricter
time frame for intervention would enable this objective to be achieved.
4. AWARDING COSTS UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF THE
SOUND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Apart from procedural measures, what other solutions could the Court implement to
protect the sound administration of justice? The award of costs is an option which is
sometimes mentioned, although it should be noted that, in litigation between States,
the principle that each party bears its own costs remains firmly established.84 To
date, neither the Court nor ITLOS have deviated from this principle.85
The M/V Saiga case before ITLOS was symptomatic of the extreme reluctance of
international jurisdictions to accede to requests for costs. In that case, the Special
Agreement bringing the matter before the Tribunal provided: ‘The
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea shall address all claims for damages
and costs . . . and shall be entitled to make an award on the legal and other costs
incurred by the successful party in the proceedings before the International
83 Indeed, the Court did not hold hearings on the issue of intervention either in Jurisdictional Immunities of
the State or in Whaling in the Antarctic. On this point see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State
(Germany v Italy; Greece Intervening), Order of 6 July 2010, Declaration of Judge ad hoc Gaja, ICJ Rep
2010, 398.
84 See art 64 of the Statute of the ICJ; art 34 of the Statute of ITLOS; art 40, para 1, of the PCA Optional
Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States. In Application for Review of Judgment No 158 of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, the ICJ described this rule as a ‘basic principle regarding the ques-
tion of costs in contentious proceedings before international tribunals’ (Advisory Opinion, 12 July 1973,
ICJ Rep 1973, 212, para 98).
85 For the ICJ: in addition to the Advisory Opinion in Application for Review of Judgment No 158 (ibid), see
also ICJ, Judgment, 11 July 1996, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep
1996, 622, para 46; Judgment, 25 March 1999, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June
1998 in the Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v
Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v Cameroon), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1999, 39–40, para 18;
Judgment, 19 June 2012, Compensation Owed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Republic of
Guinea, ICJ Rep 2012, 344, paras 58–60; Judgment, 16 December 2015, Construction of a Road in Costa
Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica); Proceedings Joined with Certain Activities Carried
Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), paras 143–44.
For ITLOS: see Judgment, 1 July 1999, The M/V ‘SAIGA’ Case (No 2) (Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines v Guinea), paras 88–89; Order, 3 December 2001, The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v United
Kingdom), Provisional Measures, para 88; Order, 8 October 2003, Case concerning Land Reclamation
by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johore (Malaysia v Singapore), Provisional Measures, paras
105–106; Judgment of 18 December 2004, The ‘Juno Trader’ Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v
Guinea Bissau), Prompt Release, paras 103–04; Judgment, 28 May 2013, The M/V ‘Louisa’ Case (Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines v Kingdom of Spain), paras 156–59.
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Tribunal’.86 Nevertheless, the Tribunal saw ‘no need to depart from the general rule
that each party shall bear its own costs’.87 This case demonstrates that the rule on
costs is an unwritten rule or general principle governing international litigation,
which the parties cannot exclude, even by mutual agreement.
It is true that the Court, like ITLOS, does retain the power to award costs if it be-
lieves that such a decision would be appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
However, in the absence of a clear decision to that effect, international case law can
tell us little as to the nature of such circumstances.
A first hypothesis would be where there has been an abuse of process: at least this
is what emerges indirectly from parties’ arguments. They have requested costs when
they believe that the other party commenced proceedings which it knew were
doomed to fail.88 The second hypothesis is that of deliberate violation of a decision
of the Court, thus allegedly compromising the integrity of the judicial process. This
was highlighted by the recent decision in the joined Costa Rica v Nicaragua cases, in
which the Court, while stating that ‘the breach by Nicaragua of its obligations under
the 2011 Order necessitated Costa Rica engaging in new proceedings on provisional
measures’,89 nonetheless refused Costa Rica’s request for costs. A significant minority
of the Court disagreed with this decision, in the following terms:
The power to indicate provisional measures is of the utmost importance for
the maintenance of the integrity of proceedings before the Court . . . . The
Court, and those States appearing before it, are entitled to assume that a State
litigating in good faith will be scrupulous in complying with those measures. If
its failure to do so necessitates a further hearing, it is only right that that State
should bear the costs incurred.90
Far from being a minor and purely financial question, the refusal of international
courts to accede to requests for costs highlights certain peculiarities of inter-State liti-
gation. First, it contrasts with commercial or investement arbitration, where the
award of costs is regarded as an ancillary right of the winning party,91 the arbitrators
simply reserving the right to assess the amount awarded in light of the merits of the
86 ITLOS, The M/V ‘SAIGA’ Case (No 2), Notification of Special Agreement, 20 February 1998, point 4.
87 ibid, para 182. See also Joint Declaration of Judges Caminos, Yankov, Akl, Anderson, Vukas, Treves and
Eiriksson.
88 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (n 85) 622, para
46. See also Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (n 85); Award, 18 March 2015, Chagos Marine
Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), para 546; Award, 1 January 2008, Italian
Republic v Republic of Cuba, para 256, <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0435_0.pdf.> accessed 15 March 2016.
89 ICJ, Judgment, 16 December 2015, Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River
(Nicaragua v Costa Rica); Proceedings Joined with Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border
Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), para 144.
90 Ibid, Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka and Greenwood, Sebutinde and Judge ad hoc Dugard, para 8.
91 I Uchkunova, ‘Allocation of Costs in ICSID Arbitration’, 3 December 2014, <http://kluwerarbitration
blog.com/blog/2014/12/03/allocation-of-costs-in-icsid-arbitration/> accessed 15 March 2016. See also
D Caron and L Caplan, ‘The Costs of Arbitration’, in The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. A Commentary
(2nd edn, OUP 2013, 839–905).
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case and the conduct of the parties.92 In inter-State litigation, a decision to award
costs would amount to designating a clear loser and winner,93 which would not sit
well with the primary role of international jurisdictions, which is one of the fostering
peaceful relations between States.
This also demonstrates the habitual reluctance of international courts to find that
a sovereign State has acted in bad faith (‘abuse of rights’ being simply another way of
saying the same thing),94 or that it has litigated frivolously. The award of costs on
this basis would raise more problems than it would solve: first and foremost, the risk
of discouraging States to commence unilateral proceedings before the Court
when they are unsure of their jurisdictional basis. From this standpoint, awarding
costs to a State which succeeded with the preliminary objections stage is not a prac-
tical alternative to a finding of manifest lack of jurisdiction at the provisional meas-
ures stage.95 Above all, in factual circumstances such as those in the Legality of the
Use of Force cases or DRC v Rwanda, it is politically problematic for the Court to de-
clare applications frivolous or abusive.96 By contrast with a domestic court or an arbi-
trator in joint proceedings, the function of an international court also involves
diplomacy.
5. CONCLUSION
Practice over the past 10 years in regard to working methods shows a Court becom-
ing increasingly prescriptive in relation to the conduct of proceedings. Generally
speaking, recent initiatives have been well received, with reservations only being ex-
pressed where the Court has gone beyond the Rules, or where it has shown itself too
accommodating on breaches of standards which it itself has established; this is par-
ticularly apparent in the case of Practice Directions. What reforms might be
proposed?
The Court shows little appetite for revising the Rules97 or the Resolution con-
cerning the Internal Judicial Practice,98 doubtless continuing to place its faith in trad-
ition. Moreover, the Mavrommatis dictum that the Court is ‘not bound to attach to
matters of form the same degree of importance which they might possess in
92 See the very interesting discussion of the application of these principles in the award of 4 August 2010,
Foresti and other v Republic of South Africa (No ARB(AF)/07/1), paras 107–40; Award of 8 October
2009, EDF (Services) Limited v Romania, paras 321–28 <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0267.pdf> accessed on 15 March 2016; and in the same case, dissenting opinion of
Arbitrator Rovine regarding costs, available at <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu
ments/ita0266.pdf> accessed 15 March 2016.
93 Shabtai Rosenne recalls ‘the classic theory of international arbitration and the principle of the equality of
the parties, according to which it is not appropriate to regard the parties as standing in some sort of plain-
tiff/defendant relationship’ (Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice (Brill/Nijhoff 2006)
vol III, 1314–15, see also ibid, 1240–45).
94 See ICJ, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ
Rep 1992, 255, para 38.
95 See above Section I (2).
96 See the concurring opinions quoted in Miron (n 64) 22–24.
97 The Rules have not undergone any major revisions since 1978, and only occasional revisions in 1972,
2000 and 2005.
98 The Resolution concerning the Internal Judicial Practice of the Court was adopted on 12 April 1976 and
has never been revised since.
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municipal law’99 continues to carry weight with the present Court.100 The Court pre-
fers to make changes through its decisions, rather than by formal revisions. These
may well be effective in the longer term, but have the disadvantage of not producing
immediate effects and of being influenced by the particular circumstances of the
cases in which they have been adopted.
But in the case of recurrent problems—such as, for example, with the right to ap-
point an ad hoc judge in cases where several parties are in the same interest—revi-
sion of the Rules appears to be the best solution, as it establishes consistency, and
makes the course of the proceedings more predictable. For States finding themselves
before the Court for the first time, this is important. Given the scant respect shown
by States for the Practice Directions, we might further ask whether some of these
would not merit being raised to the status of ‘hard law’ and integrated into the Rules.
The sound administration of inter-State justice requires a shrewd mix of tradition
and innovation, solemnity and pragmatism. The Court has shown pragmatism by
abandoning the posture of blind deference to States and by taking control over nu-
merous aspects of the conduct of proceedings. It has nonetheless shown a concern
for tradition—not only through the ceremonial aspect of the judicial process or the
renovation of the Great Hall in line with the spirit of its history, but also in the way
the proceedings are conducted. Doing the utmost to maintain a peaceful atmosphere
between the parties, and showing consideration towards States (even to losing
States), are also aspects of sound administration of the international justice. But the
Court cannot achieve this without the cooperation of the parties and their counsel,
who must comply with strict ethical rules.101
It is true that States are not ordinary litigants. And there is nothing ordinary about
a trial before the ICJ—which is doubtless why it is simply known as ‘La Cour’.
99 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ, Ser A, No 2, 30 August 1924, 34.
100 See, among others, Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment of 2 December 1963, ICJ Rep 1963, 28; Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v
Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Rep 1992, 265, para 65; Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, ICJ Rep 2008, 439, para 82.
101 Sienho YEE (ILA Study Group), UN Reform through Practice Report, 2011, 62–74 <http://www.ila-hq.
org/en/committees/study_groups.cfm/cid/0> accessed 15 March 2016.
394  Working Methods of the Court







Les me´thodes de travail de la Cour
Dr. Alina Miron*
RESUME
Par le passe´, les me´thodes de travail de la CIJ avaient e´te´ critique´es pour leur lenteur et
leur exce`s de formalisme. Les re´formes des deux dernie`res de´cennies ont permis d’y
reme´dier en partie. Les attentes re´centes des justiciables oscillent paradoxalement entre
une fermete´ plus grande de la Cour, dans la gestion de la proce´dure e´crite et orale, et
une meilleure prise en conside´ration des vœux proce´duraux des parties. Il y a en outre
des demandes pressantes pour plus d’interactivite´ entre le sie`ge et la barre. Certes, la
bonne administration de la justice inter-e´tatique exige un savant dosage entre formal-
isme et solennite´, d’une part, et ﬂexibilite´ et dynamisme, d’autre part, mais celui-ci ne
saurait se faire au de´triment de l’e´galite´ des parties et de la pre´visibilite´ proce´durale.




S’il est un the`me ou la fide´lite´ a la tradition le dispute a l’esprit de re´forme, c’est bien
celui des me´thodes de travail de la Cour internationale de Justice. Une institution
qui f^ete 70 anne´es d’expe´rience dans le re`glement des diffe´rends, auxquelles on peut
ajouter les 18 de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, peut se fe´liciter du
fait que ses me´thodes de travail aient fait leurs preuves.
Mais la Cour sait douter de ses certitudes. Aussi surveille-t-elle en permanence le
cheminement d’un dossier entre le moment ou elle est saisie et celui ou elle rend sa
de´cision, et tente-t-elle d’en corriger le trace´ lorsque les de´tours se font trop nom-
breux. Elle est doublement a l’affu^t: d’une part la Cour guette les mauvaises pratiques
de ses justiciables et tente de couper le mal a la racine. C’est la vocation principale
des Instructions de proce´dure et de leur re´vision re´gulie`re1. D’autre part, elle pre^te
une oreille attentive aux reproches et suggestions qui lui sont faits et s’efforce de
re´pondre aux attentes a la fois de ses justiciables directs (les Etats et les organisations
internationales2), a celles de la communaute´ internationale dans son ensemble et
* Professeure de droit international, Universite´ d’Angers.
1 Les premie`res Instructions de proce´dure ont e´te´ adopte´es en octobre 2001. Elles ont e´te´ re´vise´es ou amen-
de´es en 2002, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2013.
2 L’analyse ne porte ici que sur les affaires contentieuses. Si certains the`mes se retrouvent e´galement dans les proce´-
dures d’avis consultatifs, leurs spe´cificite´s demeurent assez nombreuses et requie`rent une analyse a part.
VC The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
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enfin a celles de la petite socie´te´ de juristes qui gravitent autour d’elle. On mesure la
difficulte´ de la t^ache lorsque l’on sait que ces attentes peuvent parfois e^tre contradic-
toires et que les inte´re^ts particuliers des uns se heurtent aux inte´re^ts des autres, voire
aux exigences d’une bonne administration de la justice.
La Cour a de`s lors encourage´ un dialogue re´gulier sur le the`me de ses me´thodes
de travail. Le se´minaire du 70e anniversaire n’en est qu’un e´pisode, ce qui montre
bien qu’elle ne conside`re jamais l’e´difice comme acheve´. La tradition des se´minaires
d’e´change a e´te´ inaugure´e lors du 50e anniversaire et s’est poursuivie lors du 60e
anniversaire3. A l’e´poque, l’attention s’e´tait particulie`rement focalise´e sur les prob-
le`mes d’efficacite´ et sur les re´formes qui pouvaient permettre a la Cour de gagner en
rapidite´, sans pour autant sacrifier la qualite´ de la de´cision judiciaire. La Cour s’est
montre´e sensible aux critiques relatives a la lenteur de sa proce´dure et re´ceptive a
certaines des propositions faites4. Elle a ainsi accepte´ de re´duire les de´lais de la proce´-
dure e´crite, d’examiner plusieurs affaires en me^me temps pour diminuer ainsi le
temps d’attente entre le moment ou le dossier se trouve en l’e´tat et la date des
Tableau 1. Productivite´ de l’activite´ judiciaire: proce´dures contentieuses
Anne´e Affaires porte´es devant la Cour Arre^ts Ordonnances* Radiation du roˆle
2015 0 3 1 1
2014 5 2 1
2013 4 2 5 1
2012 0 4
2011 2 4 3 1
2010 3 2 1 2
2009 3 3 1
2008 6 3 2
2007 0 3 1
2006 3 1 1 1
2005 1 3
Total 27 30 16 6
*A l’exception des ordonnances de proce´dure (ﬁxation de de´lai, de´signation d’experts, jonction d’instances, etc.)
Durant la pe´riode conside´re´e, la Cour a rendu deux avis consultatifs:
- Avis consultatif du 22 juillet 2010 - Conformite´ au droit international de la de´claration unilate´rale d’inde´pendance relative
au Kosovo
- Avis consultatif du 1er fe´vrier 2012 - Jugement N 2867 du Tribunal administratif de l’Organisation internationale du
travail sur requ^ete contre le Fonds international de De´veloppement agricole
3 Voir C. Peck et R. Lee, Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice: Proceedings of the ICJ/
UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Court, Kluwer Law International, 1997, partic-
ulie`rement p. 101–164 et CIJ/UNITAR, Un dialogue a la Cour : actes du colloque organise´ a l’occasion du
soixantie`me anniversaire de la Cour internationale de Justice, 2006, particulie`rement p. 19–36.
4 Voir, en particulier, le rapport D. Bowett et al. (ed), The International Court of Justice: Process, Practice And
Procedure, London, 1997, p. 190 e´galement discute´ par C.N. Brower et al., «Process, Practice and
Procedure of the International Court of Justice», Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of
International Law), vol. 92, 1998, p. 278–290.
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audiences, bref de mieux maıˆtriser le calendrier judiciaire5. Elle a par ailleurs alle´ge´ le
de´libe´re´ pour certaines phases, comme en atteste la suppression des notes des juges
pour les exceptions pre´liminaires6.
Ces efforts ont porte´ leurs fruits, puisque la Cour a entie`rement absorbe´ son
arrie´re´ judiciaire7. En outre, les de´lais de traitement des nouvelles affaires ne sont
ge´ne´ralement pas plus longs que ceux d’un tribunal arbitral. Comme le montre le
tableau 2: Dure´e des proce´dures pour les affaires introduites durant les 10 dernie`res anne´es
ci-apre`s, la moyenne de traitement d’une affaire sur le fond se situe entre 3 et 4 ans,
re´duite de deux tiers pour les exceptions pre´liminaires. Les e´carts qui persistent sont
dus aux Parties plus qu’a la Cour elle-me^me, qui a trouve´ un rythme de croisie`re tout
a fait acceptable au regard de la complexite´ des dossiers et des enjeux qui lui sont
soumis. C’est une bonne nouvelle et il convient de la mettre en exergue d’emble´e.
La seconde bonne nouvelle c’est que la Cour be´ne´ficie aujourd’hui de ressources
financie`res et personnelles suffisantes pour mener a bien sa mission: en tout cas, les
discours du pre´sident devant l’Assemble´e ge´ne´rale des Nations Unies ne font plus
e´tat de contraintes budge´taires notables ou de manque de personnel. Si un surplus
de ressources permettait a la Cour de se montrer plus accueillante a l’e´gard de cer-
taines suggestions des parties ou de multiplier ses campagnes d’information8, les
fonds qui lui sont alloue´s par l’Assemble´e ge´ne´rale, du reste modestes en comparai-
son avec ceux des autres juridictions internationales9, permettent d’envisager avec
se´re´nite´ la gestion de la «maison».
Ces bonnes nouvelles ne donnent pour autant pas a la Cour le privile`ge de se
reposer sur ses lauriers. D’ailleurs, elle ne semble pas en avoir l’intention, a en juger
d’apre`s les the`mes choisis pour ce se´minaire. Mais l’adaptation des me´thodes de trav-
ail c’est comme le bricolage d’une maison: certaines anne´es, c’est la charpente me^me
qu’il faut renforcer; d’autres, on peut se contenter de colmater les bre`ches.
L’expe´rience des dix dernie`res anne´es n’a pas mis en e´vidence de faiblesses syste´mi-
ques alarmantes: on en conclut que la charpente est encore solide.
5 Voir Juge Keneth Keith, «Challenges to the Independence of the International Judiciary», Chatham
House, Transcript, 26 novembre 2014, disponible en ligne: https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/chal
lenges-independence-international-judiciary, p. 9, consulte´ le 15 mars 2016.
6 Voir Dame Rosalyn Higgins, «Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight Courtroom», The
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 50, No 1, 2001, p. 123.
7 Voir Rapport annuel CIJ (2009–2010), Documents officiels de l’Assemble´e ge´ne´rale, soixante-cinquie`me session,
Supple´ment. no 4, A/65/4, p. 7, par. 22 ; Discours de S. Exc. M. Peter Tomka, pre´sident de la Cour interna-
tionale de Justice, a l’occasion de la 68e session de l’AGNU, 31 octobre 2013.
8 Il ne faudrait pas sous-estimer l’importance des campagnes d’information ou se´minaires de formation, car
«[dans] la socie´te´ universelle, les re´ticences au re`glement judiciaire ne pourront e^tre vaincues que pour
autant que l’activite´ du juge international soit familie`re aux Etats» (Philippe Couvreur, «Aperc¸u du statut
et des fonctions du greffier de la Cour Internationale de Justice», in C. Apostolidis (dir.), Les arr^ets de la
Cour internationale de Justice, Editions Universitaires de Dijon, 2005, p. 78.
9 Discours de S. Exc. M. Peter Tomka a l’occasion de la soixante-septie`me session de l’Assemble´e ge´ne´rale
des Nations Unies, 1er novembre 2012 : «les Etats membres de l’Organisation lui allouent moins d’un
pour cent — 0,8% exactement — de la totalite´ du budget re´gulier onusien». A titre comparatif, le budget
re´vise´ de la Cour pour l’exercice biennal 2014–2015 e´tait de 51 403 100 dollars des EtatsUnis, soit environ
47 millions, tandis que celui du Tribunal international du droit de la mer e´tait de 18 886 200 d’euros pour
les exercices 2015 a 2016, alors que celui de la Cour pe´nale internationale pour 2015 s’e´levait a 130,67 mil-
lions d’euros.
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Les affaires re´centes ont ne´anmoins re´ve´le´ des points ne´vralgiques a chacune des
e´tapes du cheminement d’un dossier contentieux dans le Palais de la Paix, de l’intro-
duction de l’instance au prononce´ de l’arre^t. Ainsi, de la radiation au stade des
mesures conservatoires, de la re´duction du nombre des pie`ces e´crites, de la gestion
de la proce´dure orale ou des proce´dures incidentes, pour ne donner que ces exem-
ples. Certains proble`mes ne sont d’ailleurs gue`re nouveaux. Leur persistance fait
ne´anmoins douter de l’efficacite´ des mesures adopte´es par le passe´ pour les neutral-
iser. Ainsi, la Cour s’efforce depuis longtemps et sans succe`s a endiguer le volume de
la proce´dure e´crite et a mieux canaliser le flot de la proce´dure orale. Malgre´ l’adop-
tion de plusieurs instructions de proce´dure, peu de progre`s ont e´te´ re´alise´s dans ce
domaine. Ce sont la des bre`ches potentielles a colmater et il existe plusieurs propos-
itions en ce sens. Elles vont quasiment toutes dans le sens d’une affirmation plus har-
die du pouvoir de de´cision de la Cour en matie`re de conduite du proce`s.
Par le passe´, la Cour se gardait de contrarier la volonte´ e´tatique, a fortiori lorsque
les deux Parties partageaient une vision commune. Cette de´fe´rence a la souverainete´
e´tatique semble s’estomper. Le sentiment d’e´blouissement de´crit jadis par le pre´si-
dent Mohammed Bedjaoui, «d’e´tonnement d’^etre des juges investis du pouvoir de
juger les Etats, ces monstres immate´riels aure´ole´s de la souverainete´ sacro-sainte»10
laisse graduellement la place a une approche plus pragmatique, dont Dame Rosalyn
Higgins s’e´tait fait le he´raut dans les anne´es 2000:
«One must focus on desired outcomes and one must be transparent in all decision-
making. There is no intangible “value-added” to be built in to decisions, whether
procedural or substantive, by virtue of the fact that they concern sovereign
States.»11
Nombre des de´cisions proce´durales re´centes te´moignent de ce changement d’atti-
tude. Me^me si la Cour consulte toujours les Parties quant a leurs vœux proce´duraux,
elle s’en de´partit plus facilement si elle estime que l’inte´re^t de la bonne administra-
tion de la justice l’exige. Ce principe, jadis invoque´ pour combler des lacunes dans
les re`gles statutaires12, fait aujourd’hui fonction de boussole pour l’adoption de
mesures proce´durales ponctuelles. Il permet a la Cour de trouver un e´quilibre entre
la protection des droits proce´duraux des parties et le de´roulement ordonne´ de la pro-
ce´dure, suivant les re`gles contenues dans le Statut et le Re`glement. Le maintien
d’une telle balance est un de´fi permanent qui se manifeste a chacune des e´tapes —
de l’introduction de l’instance, en passant par la gestion du proce`s et le de´libe´re´ et en
terminant par le prononce´ de l’arre^t.
10 M. Bedjaoui, «Le cinquantie`me anniversaire de la Cour internationale de Justice», Recueil des cours de
l’Acade´mie du droit international de La Haye, Vol. 257, Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 20.
11 Dame Rosalyn Higgins, op. cit. note 6, p. 131.
12 Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, arr^et no 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. se´rie A no 2, p. 16 (proce´dure a suivre en cas
de contestation de la compe´tence in limine litis) ; adoption de mesures conservatoires : Diffe´rend frontalier
(Burkina Faso/Re´publique du Mali), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 10 janvier 1986,
C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 9, par. 19.
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I . L ’ INSCRIPTION ET LA RADIATION DU ROˆLE: DES ACTES
D’ADMINISTRATION IMPORTANTS POUR LA PRE´SERVATION DU
CONSENTEMENT E´TATIQUE
La volonte´ e´tatique joue un roˆle critique dans la mise en mouvement de la proce´dure
judiciaire. Affirmation banale s’il en est, mais qui connaıˆt des ramifications proce´dur-
ales importantes lors de la phase d’introduction de l’instance.
1. Le forum prorogatum et l’inscription au roˆle
L’article 38, paragraphe 5, du Re`glement13 pose les conditions proce´durales du forum
prorogatum — a savoir l’absence d’inscription d’une affaire au roˆle de la Cour tant
que l’Etat potentiellement de´fendeur n’a pas donne´ son consentement. Il a e´te´
adopte´ lors de la re´vision de 1978 a la fois pour mieux prote´ger le consentement de
l’Etat et pour des raisons d’e´conomie proce´durale. Sous l’ancien re´gime, «[la] Cour
devait donc inscrire a son roˆle des «affaires» a l’e´gard desquelles elle n’avait manifes-
tement pas compe´tence et auxquelles il ne pouvait, de ce fait, e^tre donne´ aucune
suite; elle e´tait amene´e par conse´quent a rendre des ordonnances a seule fin de les
rayer du roˆle»14, parfois longtemps apre`s l’introduction de la reque^te.
Actuellement, si l’affaire ne se poursuit pas, la reque^te est non seulement «classe´e
sans suite», mais l’absence d’inscription au roˆle condamne aussi a l’oubli les revendi-
cations de l’Etat demandeur: il en reste, pour toute trace de la saisine de la Cour,
uniquement le communique´ de presse publie´ par le Greffe le jour du de´poˆt de la
reque^te, qui se perd rapidement dans le flot continu des communique´s. Tel fut par
exemple le sort des reque^tes introduites par le Rwanda contre la France15, par
l’Argentine contre les Etats-Unis16, par les Iles Marshall contre la Chine, les Etats-
Unis d’Ame´rique, la Fe´de´ration de Russie, la France, Isra€el et la Re´publique popu-
laire de´mocratique de Core´e17. On peut toutefois se demander si la justice internatio-
nale ne serait pas mieux servie si une certaine forme de publicite´ leur e´tait donne´e,
notamment a travers la cre´ation d’une rubrique a part sur le site de la Cour et dans
ses publications qui liste les reque^tes introduites sur la base de forum prorogatum et
classe´es sans suite. En effet, l’introduction d’une telle reque^te te´moigne a la fois de
l’existence d’un diffe´rend et de la conviction de l’Etat demandeur que les voies de la
13 Il pre´voit quet : «5. Lorsque le demandeur entend fonder la compe´tence de la Cour sur un consentement
non encore donne´ ou manifeste´ par l’Etat contre lequel la reque^te est forme´e, la reque^te est transmise a
cet Etat. Toutefois, elle n’est pas inscrite au roˆle ge´ne´ral de la Cour et aucun acte de proce´dure n’est effec-
tue´ tant que l’Etat contre lequel la reque^te est forme´e n’a pas accepte´ la compe´tence de la Cour aux fins
de l’affaire.»
14 Certaines questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en matie`re pe´nale (Djibouti c. France), arr^et,
C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 204, par. 63.
15 Voir communique´ de presse du 18 avril 2007, La Re´publique du Rwanda s’adresse a la Cour internationale
de Justice en vue de lui soumettre un diffe´rend qui l’oppose a la France.
16 Voir communique´ de presse 2014/25, du 7 aou^t 2014, La Re´publique argentine entend saisir la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice d’une instance contre les EtatsUnis d’Ame´rique et demande a ceuxci d’accepter la compe´-
tence de la Cour.
17 Communique´ de presse no 2014/18, du 25 avril 2014, La Re´publique des Iles Marshall de´pose des requ^etes
contre neuf Etats pour manquement alle´gue´ a leurs obligations concernant la cessation de la course aux armes
nucle´aires a une date rapproche´e et le de´sarmement nucle´aire.
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ne´gociation ont e´choue´. La publicite´ de la reque^te, les re´actions publiques qu’elle
pourrait susciter, peuvent devenir des allie´es dans l’acceptation de la compe´tence de
la Cour.
2. DE´SISTEMENT D’ACTION ET RADIATION DU ROˆLE
Normalement, le de´sistement d’action par les parties, qui entraıˆne la radiation d’une
affaire du roˆle, ne soule`ve pas de difficulte´ particulie`re pour la protection du con-
sentement e´tatique, comme le montre le nombre relativement important de radi-
ations intervenues durant les dix dernie`res anne´es18. Seul le calendrier de la Cour
peut s’en trouver bouscule´, si la radiation intervient tardivement au cours du proce`s.
En effet, le Re`glement est libe´ral et permet aux parties de se de´sister a tout moment
avant l’arre^t de´finitif sur le fond19. Il est ainsi arrive´ a deux reprises — dans Timor-
Leste c. Australie et dans Equateur c. Colombie20 — que le de´sistement intervienne
peu de temps avant la date pre´vue pour les audiences. La Cour ne s’en offusque tou-
tefois pas et pre´fe`re souligner la comple´mentarite´ entre l’action judiciaire et le re`gle-
ment ne´gocie´:
«When giving notice of discontinuance and agreeing to it, both Parties praised the
Court for the time, resources and energy it had devoted to the case and acknowl-
edged that reaching a settlement would have been difficult, if not impossible, but for
the involvement of the Court.»21
Cela e´tant, la radiation peut se re´ve´ler re´ellement proble´matique dans deux hypothe`-
ses: d’abord, lorsque les rivalite´s politiques internes se prolongent dans le pre´toire.
La Cour s’efforce, souvent avec succe`s, a pre´server son inde´pendance et a maintenir
une saine distance a cet e´gard. Mais ces rivalite´s se traduisent parfois par la nomin-
ation de deux agents, qui font des actes de proce´dure contradictoires, comme par
exemple des de´clarations de de´sistement ou de continuation de la proce´dure. Les
doutes sur la qualite´ du repre´sentant de l’Etat entraıˆnent des doutes quant a la val-
idite´ de ses actes de proce´dure. Il en fut ainsi dans l’affaire du Ge´nocide (Bosnie c.
Serbie)22, mais aussi dans Honduras c. Bre´sil. Dans la premie`re, apre`s avoir constate´
que «la Bosnie-Herze´govine n’avait pas manifeste´ de manie`re non e´quivoque sa
volonte´ de retirer sa reque^te»23, la Cour avait conclu qu’il n’y avait pas eu de de´siste-
ment. A l’oppose´, dans Honduras c. Bre´sil, dans l’espoir d’une clarification de la
18 Voir tableau no 1, Proce´dures contentieuses / Contentious cases, ci-apre`s.
19 Il existe une le´ge`re diffe´rence entre la demande de de´sistement adresse´e conjointement et la demande
unilate´rale : l’article 88 du Re`glement permet aux parties de demander de commun accord la radiation du
roˆle, a «un moment quelconque avant l’arre^t de´finitif sur le fond», tandis que l’article 89, paragraphe 2,
prote`ge le de´fendeur contre les proce´dures abusives, en lui donnant la possibilite´ de s’opposer a la radi-
ation s’il a de´ja fait acte de proce´dure.
20 Voir aussi discours de S. Exc. M. Shi Jiuyong, «Les me´thodes de travail interne de la Cour internationale
de Justice», Sixie`me Commission de l’Assemble´e ge´ne´rale des Nations Unies, 28 octobre 2005, p. 3.
21 K. Keith, op. cit. note 5, p. 8.
22 Application de la convention pour la pre´vention et la re´pression du crime de ge´nocide (BosnieHerze´govine
c. SerbieetMonte´ne´gro), arr^et, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I), p. 52–54, par. 18–24.
23 ibid, p. 54, par. 25.
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situation interne, l’affaire n’a e´te´ inscrite que tardivement au roˆle24 et le pre´sident a
adopte´ une ordonnance de radiation lorsque tout doute sur la qualite´ des repre´sent-
ants e´tatiques a e´te´ leve´25.
Une autre difficulte´ se manifeste en cas de radiation pour incompe´tence mani-
feste. Le Re`glement ne pre´voit pas de proce´dure spe´cifique26. Le substitut qui s’en
rapproche le plus est la radiation au stade des mesures conservatoires, que la Cour a
prononce´e dans Lice´ite´ de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Etats-Unis d’Ame´rique et
Yougoslavie c. Espagne)27. La solution est acquise au terme d’un de´bat contradictoire,
tranche´ par la Cour dans son ensemble, au moyen d’un acte juridictionnel (et non
pas purement administratif). Toutefois, ce substitut soule`ve des interrogations:
• une telle possibilite´ n’est pre´vue ni par le Statut, ni par le Re`glement28. La Cour
exerce donc ce pouvoir praeter legem;
• les conditions jurisprudentielles de radiation pour incompe´tence manifeste ne sont
gue`re explicite´es29;
• en principe, la «conclusion provisoire [de l’ordonnance en indication de mesures
conservatoires] ne [pre´juge] en rien [la] de´cision finale sur la question de savoir si
elle a compe´tence pour connaıˆtre de l’affaire au fond»30. Il est difficile de concilier
cette affirmation, pourtant bien fonde´e31, avec une de´cision de radiation pour
incompe´tence manifeste;
• quid si aucune demande en indication de mesures conservatoires n’est introduite?
Curieusement, la protection du consentement de l’Etat de´fendeur devient alors
de´pendante d’un acte de proce´dure de l’Etat demandeur. Telle ne peut e^tre la voca-
tion des mesures conservatoires.
24 L’affaire de Certaines questions en matie`re de relations diplomatiques porte le nume´ro 147, alors que la pro-
ce´dure Compe´tence judiciaire et exe´cution des de´cisions en matie`re civile et commerciale (Belgique c. Suisse),
dont la reque^te est pourtant poste´rieure a celle du Honduras, porte le nume´ro 145.
25 Voir Certaines questions en matie`re de relations diplomatiques (Honduras c. Bre´sil), ordonnance du
12 mai 2010, C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (I), p. 303. Voir aussi C.I.J., Rapport annuel (2009–2010), Nations Unies,
doc. A/65/4, par. 14–15 et 88–89 ; ou encore le discours de S. Exc. M. Hisashi Owada, pre´sident de la
Cour internationale de Justice, devant l’Assemble´e ge´ne´rale a sa soixantecinquie`me session, 28 octo-
bre 2010, p. 7.
26 Voir Sienho Yee, «A Proposal for Formalizing the “No Case Exists” Objections Procedure at the
International Court of Justice», Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 4(2), 2005, pp. 393–416.
27 Voir Lice´ite´ de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Espagne), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du
2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 761, et Lice´ite´ de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. EtatsUnis
d’Ame´rique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 916.
28 Voir Lice´ite´ de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Etats-Unis d’Ame´rique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance
du 2 juin 1999, opinion de M. le juge Parra-Aranguren, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 950, par. 4.
29 La demande de radiation a e´te´ rejete´e dans Demande en interpre´tation de l’arr^et du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire
du Temple de Pre´ah Vihe´ar (Cambodge c. Thaı¨lande) (Cambodge c. Thaı¨lande), mesures conservatoires, or-
donnance du 18 juillet 2011, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (II), p. 543, par. 31 et p. 555, par. 69.
30 Application de la convention internationale sur l’e´limination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale
(Ge´orgie c. Fe´de´ration de Russie), exceptions pre´liminaires, arr^et, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 124, par. 129.
31 Voir aussi Avena et autres ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Etats-Unis d’Ame´rique), arr^et,
C.I.J. Recueil 2004 (I), ou la Cour avait adopte´ des mesures conservatoires avant de conside´rer qu’elle ne
pouvait pas exercer sa compe´tence fonde´e sur l’article 60 du Statut.
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I I . LA BONNE ADMINISTRATION DE LA PROCE´DURE:
COMPARAISON SOMMAIRE ENTRE LA COUR ET DES TRIBUNAUX
ARBITRAUX
L’une des grandes diffe´rences entre les juridictions permanentes et les tribunaux arbi-
traux re´side dans l’existence, pour les premie`res, d’un cadre proce´dural pre´e´tabli,
dans lequel vient se couler l’affaire des parties. Cela e´tant, le mode`le strictement juri-
dictionnel pre´vu par le Statut, qui n’attribue aucun roˆle aux Parties, a e´te´ sensible-
ment comple´te´ et nuance´ par le Re`glement, qui leur me´nage une place importante
dans la conduite de la proce´dure32 et re´duit ainsi la distance entre le re`glement juri-
dictionnel et le re`glement arbitral des diffe´rends. En pratique, cette tendance a l’arbi-
tralisation est d’autant plus prononce´e que, loin de s’en tenir a la simple consultation
des parties, la Cour e´tait longtemps encline a suivre leurs vœux proce´duraux. C’est
cette forme de de´fe´rence que la juge Higgins avait ouvertement de´plore´e33.
Dans la pratique re´cente, la Cour se montre plus directive et n’acce`de plus a
toutes les demandes des Parties. Cette tendance est, dans l’ensemble, accueillie
d’autant plus favorablement qu’elle fait e´cho au souhait exprime´ par les Etats et leurs
conseils de voir la Cour controˆler davantage la proce´dure, en particulier sa phase
orale34. Il reste toutefois des domaines ou la Cour pre´fe`re toujours la pe´dagogie au
commandement.
1. La constitution d’une chambre
Le principe est que les affaires sont examine´es par la Cour en formation ple´nie`re35; et
c’est effectivement ce qui se passe en pratique. Le statut envisage ne´anmoins la consti-
tution de trois types de chambres: the´matique36, de proce´dure sommaire37, et ad hoc38.
32 Pas moins de 21 articles du Re`glement (17, 31, 35, 36, 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 55, 58, 59, 63, 79, 80, 88, 89,
91, 92) pre´voient la consultation des Parties sur des questions de proce´dure. Par ailleurs, et d’une manie`re
tre`s ge´ne´rale, l’article 31 pre´voit que «Dans toute affaire soumise a la Cour, le Pre´sident se renseigne
aupre`s des parties sur les questions de proce´dure. A cette fin, il convoque les agents des parties le plus toˆt
possible apre`s leur de´signation, puis chaque fois qu’il y a lieu.» et l’article 101 : «Les parties a une affaire
peuvent proposer d’un commun accord d’apporter aux articles contenus dans le pre´sent titre, a l’exception
des articles 93 a 97 inclus, des modifications ou additions particulie`res que la Cour ou une chambre peut
adopter si elle les estime approprie´es aux circonstances de l’espe`ce.». Finalement, l’instruction de
proce´dure XIII tente d’ailleurs de simplifier les formalite´s proce´durales en permettant aux Etats parties de
s’entendre sur les futures questions de proce´dure et d’en informer la Cour par e´crit ou par
te´le´confe´rence :
«La disposition de l’article 31 du Re`glement de la Cour aux termes de laquelle le pre´sident se
renseigne aupre`s des parties sur des questions de proce´dure est a comprendre ainsi :
Apre`s la premie`re re´union tenue avec le pre´sident, les parties, lorsque celui-ci est de nouveau appele´
a se renseigner aupre`s d’elles sur des questions de proce´dure, peuvent, si elles sont d’accord sur
la proce´dure a suivre, l’en informer par lettre.
Les vues des parties concernant la suite de la proce´dure peuvent e´galement, si cellesci en sont d’ac-
cord, e^tre recueillies par te´le´confe´rence.»
33 Voir Dame Rosalyn Higgins, op. cit. note 6.
34 Voir les suggestions relatives aux plaidoiries dans le Counsel Survey.
35 Cf. article 25, paragraphe 1, du Statut.
36 Cf. article 26, paragraphe 1, du Statut.
37 Cf. article 29 du Statut.
38 Cf. article 26, paragraphe 2, du Statut.
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Les chambres ad hoc n’ont e´te´ que sporadiquement utilise´es, mais certainement
plus que les chambres pre´constitue´es, qui n’ont jamais e´te´ saisies. La dernie`re consti-
tution d’une chambre ad hoc de la CIJ date de 2002 (compromis conclu entre le
Be´nin et le Niger), tandis que le Tribunal international du droit de la mer (TIDM) a
forme´ sa premie`re chambre ad hoc a l’occasion de l’affaire Ghana/Coˆte d’Ivoire. La
constitution des chambres permet aux Etats de choisir les membres du panel, tout en
be´ne´ficiant de l’autorite´ des de´cisions de la Cour ou du TIMD, de leur expe´rience
proce´durale et des avantages mate´riels d’une institution permanente. Le contraste
avec l’inutilisation des chambres de proce´dure sommaire ou the´matique, dont la
composition est pre´de´termine´e, est saisissant. C’est en cela que les chambres ad hoc
te´moignent de l’arbitralisation de la proce´dure judiciaire: la constitution des cham-
bres permet aux Parties de de´terminer la composition de la formation de jugement,
sur laquelle ils ne peuvent en principe pas intervenir, si ce n’est a travers la nomin-
ation d’un juge ad hoc39. Toutefois, il faut prendre conscience du fait que les «cham-
bres [rendent] plus difficile la mise en œuvre du principe fondamental d’e´quilibre
entre les «principaux syste`mes juridiques» et les «grandes formes de civilisation»
(article 9 du Statut) au sein de la formation de jugement»40. La composition des
chambres — surtout celles de la Cour — re´ve`le aussi le fait que le choix des juges
est fait par affinite´s culturelles ou re´gionales. On peut le regretter ou s’en fe´liciter:
c’est peut-e^tre le prix a payer pour garder certaines affaires dans le giron
institutionnel.
2. La gestion de la proce´dure e´crite
Le volume de la proce´dure e´crite. Malgre´ l’adoption des Instructions de proce´dure, le vol-
ume des pie`ces e´crites, en particulier celui des annexes, demeure extravagant. Les
dossiers qui ont trait a la protection de l’environnement sont particulie`rement volu-
mineux et denses, ce qui pose a la fois des difficulte´s de gestion et d’appre´ciation des
preuves. Il serait d’ailleurs inte´ressant de connaıˆtre le volume documentaire de cer-
taines affaires41. Loin de nous l’ide´e de vouloir en rajouter a la charge de travail du
Greffe, mais si pour une raison ou une autre ces chiffres e´taient de´ja e´tablis, leur pub-
lication permettrait de prendre encore mieux conscience de l’ampleur des efforts qui
sont requis de la Cour et de son personnel administratif.
Cette extravagance documentaire est une source de frustration particulie`re pour la
Cour et les parties en portent la responsabilite´. Elle peut en outre s’ave´rer contre-produc-
tive. Il n’est en tout cas pas raisonnable de s’attendre a ce que les juges partent a la chasse
aux e´le´ments pertinents, si en amont l’e´quipe juridique n’a pas su faire preuve de
39 Voir les critiques plus ou moins voile´es des juges Oda, Morozov et ElKhani dans leurs opinions sous
De´limitation de la frontie`re maritime dans la re´gion du golfe du Maine (Canada/EtatsUnis d’Ame´rique), con-
stitution de chambre, ordonnance du 20 janvier 1982, C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 11–12.
40 Collectif (Greffe de la CIJ), La Cour internationale de Justice, Manuel, 6e e´d., 2014, 328 pages, disponible
en ligne : http://www.icj-cij.org/publications/fr/manuel_fr.pdf, p. 28, consulte´ le 16 mars 2016.
41 Dans une de ses interventions publiques, le juge Keneth Keith avait donne´ les chiffres vertigineux pour
l’affaire Epandages ae´riens d’herbicides (Equateur c. Colombie): «The 18 volumes include 12,294 pages and
about 90 scientific and technical reports. There was extensive evidence relating to the composition of the herbi-
cide, the patterns and places of spraying, the winds at the time of spraying, the toxic effect of the herbicide and
the health status of humans, animals and plants before and after. There were eyewitness accounts and expert re-
ports of various kinds» (op. cit. note 5, p. 8).
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discernement dans le choix des documents. Le second proble`me vient des ne´cessite´s de
traduction: faute de pouvoir traduire l’ensemble de cette masse documentaire, le Greffe
est amene´ a faire une se´lection. Or, en l’absence de crite`res pre´e´tablis, le Greffe n’est
jamais a l’abri du risque de se voir reprocher une se´lection partiale.
On revient ainsi a une question re´currente et (plus large: celle du bilinguisme.
L’utilite´ du maintien de cette tradition a pu e^tre conteste´e, mais ses de´tracteurs
occultent trop rapidement ses me´rites profonds, pour ne s’attacher qu’a la charge de
travail qu’il implique et au retard qu’il cause durant la proce´dure. Ne´anmoins, le
bilinguisme pre´sente une attractivite´ certaine pour les Etats francophones: c’est une
des raisons pour lesquelles les juridictions permanentes sont parfois pre´fe´re´es a l’arbi-
trage. Il est par ailleurs l’e´tendard, certes imparfait, de la diversite´ des cultures juridi-
ques, et celui-ci explique d’ailleurs la diversite´ culturelle et linguistique recherche´e
dans la constitution des e´quipes de conseils. Il a surtout le me´rite de fournir une
langue de controˆle, a la fois lors du de´libe´re´ et dans la re´daction des ordonnances et
des arre^ts. De ce point de vue, le bilinguisme est sans doute un des facteurs qui con-
tribuent a la sauvegarde du niveau stylistique des arre^ts de la Cour. Toujours est-il
que, malgre´ ces avantages du bilinguisme, les traductions des pie`ces de proce´dure ne
sont pas rendues publiques. Et si les Parties demandent parfois au Greffe de les part-
ager avec elles, la diffusion ne de´passe pas ce cadre restreint. N’est-il pas regrettable,
par exemple, que le monde non-francophone ne puisse pas be´ne´ficier pleinement
des e´critures des parties dans l’affaire Diallo?
Il convient de rappeler par ailleurs que le Statut et le Re`glement pre´voient aussi la
possibilite´ d’utilisation d’une langue non officielle42, mais a part un conseil de la
Libye qui en a fait usage dans l’affaire de l’Incident ae´rien de Lockerbie pour parler en
arabe, cette facilite´ n’est gue`re employe´e par les Etats43.
Le nombre d’e´changes de proce´dure e´crite. A la fois le Statut (dans son article 43,
paragraphe 2) et le Re`glement (cf. l’article 45, paragraphe 1) pre´voient que les pie`ces
de proce´dure comprennent un me´moire du demandeur et un contre-me´moire du
de´fendeur. Le principe est ainsi pose´ d’un seul e´change de pie`ces de proce´dure e´crite.
L’existence d’un second tour est une option — c’est du moins ce que sugge`re l’util-
isation de l’adverbe «e´ventuellement» par le Statut et du verbe «peut» par le
Re`glement44. Il revient a la Cour d’autoriser ou de prescrire une deuxie`me se´rie, «si
les parties sont d’accord a cet e´gard ou si la Cour de´cide, d’office ou a la demande
d’une partie, que ces pie`ces sont ne´cessaires»45. La Cour garde donc le pouvoir
d’appre´cier la ne´cessite´ d’un second tour. Voila pour la the´orie. En pratique, non
seulement l’autorisation de de´poser une re´plique et une duplique s’est-elle
42 Article 39, paragraphe 3, du Statut et article 51 du Re`glement.
43 Comp. avec son utilisation a l’e´poque de la CPJI : Vapeur Wimbledon et Droits de minorite´s en Haute-
Sile´sie, allemand ; Borchgrave et Barcelona Traction, espagnol (CIJ : Manuel, op. cit. note 40, p. 54).
44 «It is clear from the Rules that the Memorial and Counter Memorial are entitlements; and there may be a
Reply and a Rejoinder, by right if the parties agree, or otherwise at the Court’s discretion or proprio motu.
Once a third round is allowed by the Court, then the fourth round, the Rejoinder, in a sense follows automatic-
ally, because otherwise there will not be a parity of pleading rounds between the Applicant and the
Respondent.» (Dame Rosalyn Higgins, op. cit. note 6, p. 125). Voir aussi Chasse a la baleine dans
l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon ; Nouvelle-Ze´lande (intervenant)), arr^et, opinion individuelle de M. le juge
Greenwood, C.I.J. Recueil 2014, p. 418-419, par. 32-35.
45 Article 45, paragraphe 2, du Re`glement.
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ge´ne´ralise´e46, mais en outre la Cour s’estime tenue de suivre entie`rement les vœux
des parties sur ce point. Les choses ne vont diffe´remment que pour les exceptions
pre´liminaires, ou le principe d’un seul tour est de´sormais acquis47, comme l’est le
de´lai laisse´ a l’Etat demandeur pour de´poser ses Observations en re´ponse — en prin-
cipe quatre mois48.
Cette pratique ge´ne´ralise´e est une des principales raisons d’allongement de la pro-
ce´dure; elle entraıˆne en outre des frais importants, lie´s notamment a la pre´paration
de ces pie`ces. L’interrogation essentielle ne porte toutefois pas sur l’e´conomie de
temps et de moyens que la re´duction de la proce´dure e´crite permettrait; elle est de
savoir si cette limitation serait pre´judiciable a l’articulation de la position juridique
des parties et a l’instruction du dossier49. Si la re´plique et la duplique permettent
incontestablement de raffiner l’argumentaire, cette pre´cision conclusive peut
s’exercer avec talent a l’oral, et ceci aurait de surcroıˆt le me´rite de rendre les plaidoi-
ries moins re´pe´titives50.
Les affaires re´centes ont donne´ l’occasion a la Cour de revenir partiellement sur la
ge´ne´ralisation des quatre pie`ces: lorsque les Parties sont d’accord, la Cour ne fait
qu’ente´riner ce choix51. Mais elle doit exercer un re´el pouvoir de de´cision proce´dur-
ale si les deux Parties expriment des souhaits oppose´s. Ainsi, dans Chasse a la baleine
dans l’Antarctique52, la Cour s’est estime´e suffisamment informe´e des moyens de fait
et de droit sur lesquels les parties se fondaient et a de´cide´ que la pre´sentation de
nouvelles e´critures n’e´tait pas ne´cessaire.
Le choix retenu dans cette affaire a e´te´ conteste´ par le Japon. De`s lors, le juge
Greenwood a conside´re´ approprie´ de le justifier dans son opinion individuelle. Trois
ide´es maıˆtresses se de´gagent de son analyse: d’abord, que le second tour ne devrait
pas e^tre automatique53; qu’au contraire, le principe devrait e^tre celui d’un seul
46 CIJ : Manuel, op. cit. note 40, p. 51.
47 Dans Espagne c. Canada et Pakistan c. Inde, la Cour a du^ imposer son choix contre la volonte´ des parties
(cf. Dame Rosalyn Higgins, op. cit. note 6, p. 125)
48 Cf. l’Instruction de proce´dure V.
49 Ainsi, le parti-pris du Manuel publie´ par le Greffe est-il en faveur de deux se´ries d’e´changes au motif que
la «combinaison d’une phase e´crite assez longue suivie d’une phase orale plutoˆt bre`ve est souhaitable si
l’on veut que la Cour se prononce en pleine connaissance de cause : cela offre aux parties comme a la
Cour les garanties qu’exige une bonne administration de la justice internationale» (CIJ : Manuel, op. cit.
note 40, p. 50).
50 «Reading these pleadings, my sense overall is that the third and fourth rounds are usually, to use two cliche´s,
but apposite cliche´s nonetheless, arguments that are gilding the lily on the one hand and make-weights on the
other. I do believe that virtually everything in them could be-and really should be-dealt with in oral argument.
Instead, we allow these extra rounds and then complain that in the oral arguments that follow later we are hear-
ing nothing that we did not already know. I would like the Court to make these further pleadings, beyond the
Memorial and Counter Memorial, the exception rather than the norm. That would contribute greatly to dealing
faster with cases, from beginning to end, than is presently the case. But for the moment the thinking is that if sov-
ereign States wish to put further arguments to us, it is difficult to refuse their request.» (Dame Rosalyn
Higgins, op. cit. note 6, p. 125).
51 Questions concernant l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader (Belgique c. Senegal), arr^et, C.I.J. Recueil 2012, p.
427, par. 8 et Certaines questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en matie`re pe´nale (Djibouti c. France), C.I.J.
Recueil 2008, p. 182, par. 9.
52 Dans Chasse a la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon ; Nouvelle-Ze´lande (intervenant)), arr^et,
C.I.J. Recueil 2014, p. 235, par. 6.
53 Chasse a la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon ; Nouvelle-Ze´lande (intervenant)), arr^et, opinion
individuelle de M. le juge Greenwood, C.I.J. Recueil 2014, p. 418-419, par. 33.
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tour54; enfin, que «la Cour doit toujours avoir la possibilite´ de prescrire un second
tour de proce´dure e´crite si elle le juge ne´cessaire»55.
Toutefois, cette de´cision proce´durale importante reste encore largement a l’appre´-
ciation du demandeur, ce qui peut e^tre source d’ine´galite´ entre les parties. Le juge
Greenwood re´serve lui aussi une place importante aux vœux du demandeur qui,
selon lui, devrait avoir la possibilite´ d’affiner son argumentaire, en re´ponse a celui
de´ploye´ par le de´fendeur dans son contre-me´moire56. Toutefois, cette justification
ne convainc pas entie`rement, dans la mesure ou normalement les parties ne de´couv-
rent pas leurs revendications respectives dans les e´critures, en particulier si le diffe´r-
end a fait l’objet de ne´gociations pre´alables. En revanche, pour le de´fendeur, le
second tour constitue du temps supple´mentaire pour re´unir le dossier factuel. De ce
point de vue, le choix d’un seul tour peut s’ave´rer proble´matique: en effet, le deman-
deur a be´ne´ficie´, pour la pre´paration de son dossier, de plusieurs mois, voire des
anne´es, avant l’introduction de la reque^te. Ce n’est pas ne´cessairement le cas du
de´fendeur (en particulier, si les deux parties se trouvent en ne´gociation et que l’op-
tion juridictionnelle n’est ni envisage´e ni envisageable; ou encore si la situation in-
terne d’un des Etats ne permet pas une recherche efficace dans les archives).
Pour re´sumer, le principe d’un seul tour et le pouvoir de de´cision de la Cour en la
matie`re ne sont pas critiquables en eux-me^mes, bien au contraire. Ce qui l’est c’est
l’effet de surprise provoque´ par une telle de´cision, dans la mesure ou elle tranche
avec une pratique ge´ne´ralise´e, comme l’est aussi l’avantage donne´ au demandeur. La
solution pour renforcer l’acceptabilite´ d’une telle mesure consisterait dans l’adoption
d’une approche de principe au sujet du nombre de tours e´crits. Peut-^etre la question
du nombre de pie`ces e´crites devrait-elle e^tre e´voque´e plus ouvertement lors de la
premie`re rencontre proce´durale entre le pre´sident et les parties lors duquel les par-
ties devraient adopter un engagement de principe, certes sujet a modification, si les
circonstances l’exigent. Apre`s le de´poˆt du contre-me´moire, la partie qui demanderait
un second tour — que ce soit le demandeur ou le de´fendeur — devrait motiver sa
ne´cessite´ et c’est sur cette base que la Cour ou son pre´sident jugerait de l’opportunite´
de le prescrire.
54 ibid par. 35.
55 ibid par. 34.
56 «Enfin, il convient selon moi de faire la distinction entre le demandeur et le de´fendeur, lorsque la Cour
est appele´e a se prononcer sur une demande d’organisation de second tour de proce´dure e´crite formule´e
par l’une des parties, mais conteste´e par l’autre. Le premier tour de proce´dure e´crite se cloˆt par le de´poˆt
du contre-me´moire. C’est ge´ne´ralement dans ce document que le demandeur prend pour la premie`re fois
connaissance des moyens que lui opposera le de´fendeur. Le contre-me´moire peut contenir des e´le´ments
que le demandeur n’avait pas analyse´s, ou des moyens de preuve qu’il doit avoir le loisir de re´futer. Aussi
y a-t-il a priori lieu de prescrire un second tour de proce´dure e´crite, si celui-ci est sollicite´ par le deman-
deur ; s’y refuser pourrait e^tre a l’origine d’une grave injustice si le demandeur devait e^tre prive de la pos-
sibilite´ de re´agir a des moyens de fait ou de droit souleve´s par le de´fendeur dans son contre-me´moire. Le
de´fendeur, en revanche, lorsqu’il e´tablit son contre-me´moire, a l’avantage d’avoir de´ja pris connaissance et
de la reque^te et du me´moire, et il est par ailleurs tenu d’exposer dans cette pie`ce l’inte´gralite´ de ses moy-
ens. Si, ayant pris connaissance du contre-me´moire, le demandeur estime ne pas avoir besoin d’un second
tour de proce´dure e´crite, il est difficile de voir a quel titre le de´fendeur pourra affirmer que celui-ci s’im-
pose. Il a de´ja eu le dernier mot, et il n’y a pas d’injustice a se voir de´nier la possibilite´ de re´pe´ter ou
d’e´toffer son argumentation.» (ibid par. 36).
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Si la Cour devait consolider la pratique d’un seul tour e´crit, il est possible que les
parties demandent plus souvent a introduire des preuves poste´rieurement a la cloˆture
de la proce´dure e´crite. Si l’exigence d’un respect scrupuleux de l’article 56 du
Re`glement (production de documents nouveaux) est compre´hensible apre`s quatre
pie`ces de proce´dure e´crite, apre`s deux seulement on peut envisager que des docu-
ments nouveaux viennent nourrir le de´bat. Toutefois, l’autorisation de les produire
doit pre´server le principe du contradictoire: si le de´poˆt de nouveaux documents peut
e^tre exceptionnellement accepte´, a condition qu’ils soient envoye´s raisonnablement
avant le de´but de la proce´dure orale, leur introduction par effraction lors des plaidoi-
ries est tre`s pre´judiciable aux inte´re^ts de l’autre partie57. De`s lors, le soin que pre^te le
Greffe a l’application de l’instruction de proce´dure IX bis est salutaire. Cela e´tant, la
formulation de cette instruction l’est moins: l’exce`s de de´tail dans la re´glementation
fait perdre de vue les principes dont elle se nourrit. Par ailleurs, a l’e`re de l’Internet, il
conviendrait peut-e^tre de revoir la de´finition du concept «facilement accessible» qui
permet aux parties de faire re´fe´rence a un document disponible sur un site institu-
tionnel, qui aurait pu e^tre place´ la peu de temps avant le de´but de la proce´dure.
3. La conduite de la proce´dure orale
De nombreuses voix s’e´le`vent pour demander une conduite plus dynamique des
audiences58 et des discours moins re´pe´titifs de la part des conseils. Ce souhait est
partage´ a la fois par les juges, les parties et leurs conseils, ainsi que probablement par
le public occasionnel. Le proce`s dans le Grand Hall de Justice n’est pas un proce`s
d’assises, mais plus d’interactivite´ entre le sie`ge et la barre n’enle`ve rien a la solennite´
dans le pre´toire, alors que l’utilisation de la litote a la place de la re´pe´tition favoriser-
ait une meilleure pre´sentation des the`ses a l’audience.
Pour ce faire, la Cour se tourne vers les conseils. Un article du Re`glement (art.
60, par. 1) et une instruction de proce´dure (no VI) sont de´die´s a canaliser le flux des
plaidoiries. Certains juges les avaient engage´s a se montrer moins professoraux, a pre´-
fe´rer la concision a la ple´thore et le concret a l’abstrait59. Des propositions vont dans
le sens d’un raccourcissement supple´mentaire de la dure´e de la proce´dure orale (en
termes de volume horaire), tout en laissant aux parties plus de temps pour la pre´pa-
ration de la re´ponse, en particulier durant le second tour. Il y aurait la un moyen
57 «And in the East Timor case both parties presented documents after the closure of the written pleadings. One of
those — a Portuguese-Moroccan Treaty —was produced by Australia during the oral argument, indeed sprung,
in best TV courtroom drama style, upon an unsuspecting Portuguese legal team, and legal argument advanced
on it. I am able to attest to this, as I was then one of the discomfited Portuguese team. Formal objection was
made by Portugal to this late introduction of a document, and the Court, after in camera deliberation, decided
not to admit the document to the record. But the damage was already done; and it was one of those rare cases
where a single document (of which the Portuguese legal team until that moment was totally unaware) had a
very real psychological impact, regardless of whether it was formally admitted into the record or not.» (Dame
Rosalyn Higgins, op. cit. note 6, p. 130). Voir aussi TIDM, Diffe´rend relatif a la de´limitation de la frontie`re
maritime entre le Ghana et la Coˆte d’Ivoire dans l’oce´an Atlantique (Ghana/Coˆte d’Ivoire), audience du
30 mars 2015, TIDM/PV.15/A23/4, p. 6, lignes 33–40.
58 Voir Counsel Survey.
59 Sir Robert Jennings, «The Work of the International Bar», in Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to
Man : Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese, Kluwer Law International, 2003, pp.
456458.
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efficace de conduire les plaideurs a synthe´tiser leurs discours et a les rendre plus
pertinents.
Les conseils placent leurs espoirs dans la Cour. En re´ponse celle-ci a pris l’habi-
tude d’adresser des questions aux parties lors des audiences, en leur demandant plus
re´cemment d’inte´grer les re´ponses dans leurs discours et non pas de fournir ulte´ri-
eurement une re´ponse e´crite, comme c’e´tait le cas par le passe´. Du reste, cette e´volu-
tion est bien accueillie. Mais pourquoi attendre la proce´dure orale pour adresser
certaines questions aux parties et ne pas faire un plein usage des possibilite´s offertes
par l’article 61 du Re`glement? Son paragraphe premier pre´voit que «[la] Cour peut,
a tout moment avant ou durant les de´bats, indiquer les points ou les proble`mes qu’elle
voudrait voir spe´cialement e´tudier par les parties ou ceux qu’elle conside`re comme
suffisamment discute´s». Naturellement, certaines propositions visent a organiser
l’interactivite´ en amont, avant le de´but des audiences: la Cour pourrait identifier et
transmettre aux parties «toute question sur laquelle elle souhaiterait obtenir des pre´-
cisions ou des e´claircissements au stade des audiences»60. Il est inte´ressant de remar-
quer que parmi les conseils consulte´s pour le Counsel Survey, nombreux ont e´te´ ceux
qui se sont exprime´s en faveur de cette option, qu’ils soient de tradition continentale
ou de common law, professeurs ou avocats de me´tier. Cette attente de´passe donc les
clivages traditionnels.
La transmission des questions avant l’audience serait a un excellent moyen de
canaliser la discussion sur les points qui inte´ressent les juges et de soumettre au
de´bat contradictoire toute question de droit ou de fait qui est importante a leurs
yeux61. Cette possibilite´ ne saurait toutefois prendre corps sans une tenue re´gulie`re
de la de´libe´ration pre´vue a l’article 1er de la Re´solution visant la pratique interne de
la Cour en matie`re judiciaire. D’ailleurs l’organisation de cette de´libe´ration dans
Chasse a la baleine, mais aussi dans Costa Rica c. Nicaragua a rendu les plaidoiries
nettement plus actives que d’ordinaire, gr^ace aux questions que plusieurs juges ont
adresse´es aux parties et aux experts. Le pre´sident Peter Tomka avait d’ailleurs de´clare´
que «[cette] proce´dure de de´libe´ration s’ave`re particulie`rement utile dans le cadre
d’affaires a haute teneur scientifique ou dont la trame factuelle se re´ve`le tre`s com-
plexe»62. C’est sans doute vrai, mais pourquoi re´server cette de´libe´ration aux affaires
complexes ou de nature scientifique?
4. La gestion des proce´dures incidentes
Si on devait isoler une seule cause de de´sordre dans le proce`s, les incidents proce´dur-
aux seraient les premiers candidats63. La multiplication des incidents de proce´dure
inter-partes (mesures conservatoires, exceptions pre´liminaires, demandes reconven-
tionnelles) ainsi que l’intervention d’un tiers retarde le de´nouement du proce`s,
60 Discours de S. Exc. P. Tomka devant l’Assemble´e ge´ne´rale des Nations Unies, 2014, A/69/PV.33.
61 Sir Robert Jennings soulignait aussi que «It is useful for counsel to know at that point which way the judge
seems to be thinking than to be able only to make a guess too late when the final decision of the Court is handed
down» (“The Work of the International Law Bar”, in L. C. Vohrah et al. (ed), Man’s Inhumanity to Man:
Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (2003), p. 464).
62 Discours de S. Exc. P. Tomka devant l’Assemble´e ge´ne´rale des Nations Unies, 2014, A/69/PV.33. Voir
aussi K. Keith, op. cit. note 5, p. 89.
63 Voir le Tableau no 3 relatif aux proce´dures incidentes joint a cette contribution.
408  Les me´thodes de travail de la Cour














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Les me´thodes de travail de la Cour  409













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































410  Les me´thodes de travail de la Cour





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Les me´thodes de travail de la Cour  411
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































412  Les me´thodes de travail de la Cour



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Les me´thodes de travail de la Cour  413







entraıˆne d’importants cou^ts supple´mentaires64 et envenime l’atmosphe`re entre les
parties. Naturellement, l’utilisation de ces proce´dures a mauvais escient, dans un
objectif de tactique proce´durale e´loigne´ de leur vocation premie`re, est cause de
pre´occupation65. De quels moyens la Cour dispose-t-elle pour pre´venir les abus?
La Cour a re´agi a la multiplication des proce´dures incidentes inter partes soit par
la re´vision du Re`glement, soit par des ajustements jurisprudentiels qui renforcent les
conditions de recevabilite´ ou de fond. Ainsi, la re´vision de l’article 79 du Re`glement
de 2001 — qui donne au de´fendeur trois mois apre`s le de´poˆt du me´moire pour sou-
lever des exceptions pre´liminaires — a permis d’endiguer leur effet dilatoire. La re´vi-
sion de l’article 80 relatif aux demandes reconventionnelles, qui pre´serve le droit de
l’autre partie a de´poser des e´critures sur la recevabilite´ de ces demandes, n’a cepend-
ant pas atteint son but. Comme les affaires les plus re´centes le mettent en e´vidence,
leurs conditions de recevabilite´ ne sont pas re´ellement clarifie´es66.
La jonction des instances: l’approche actuelle va vers une meilleure maıˆtrise par la
Cour elle-me^me de ces de´cisions67. Ainsi, si par le passe´, la Cour s’abstenait de join-
dre les instances lorsque cette mesure n’avait pas la faveur des deux parties68,
aujourd’hui elle he´site moins a imposer son choix, lorsqu’elle est convaincue que la
bonne administration de la justice et le principe de l’e´conomie judiciaire69 l’exigent.
Cela e´tant, les conditions dans lesquelles les jonctions d’instance sont intervenues
par le passe´ sont fort diverses — parfois en cas de reque^tes croise´es entre les deux
parties70 ou de demandes reconventionnelles71, ou encore de plusieurs demandeurs
qui font cause commune72.
64 Voir quelques exemples concrets dans A. Miron, «Le cou^t de la justice internationale. Enque^te sur les as-
pects financiers du contentieux intere´tatique», Annuaire franc¸ais du droit international, vol. LX, p. 18.
65 Voir aussi J. Crawford, « Anglo-American and Continental Traditions in Advocacy before International
Courts and Tribunals » (avec A. Pellet et C. Redgwell), Cambrigde Journal of International and
Comparative Law, vol. 2(4), 2013, p. 16.
66 Voir Certaines activite´s mene´es par le Nicaragua dans la re´gion frontalie`re (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua) ;
Construction d’une route au Costa Rica le long du fleuve San Juan (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica), demandes recon-
ventionnelles, ordonnance du 18 avril 2013, de´claration de M. le juge ad hoc Guillaume, C.I.J. Recueil 2013,
p. 217, par. 3 ; Immunite´s juridictionnelles de l’Etat, ordonnance du 6 juillet 2010, opinion dissidente de M.
le juge Canc¸ado Trindade, C.I.J. Recueil 2010, p. 334.
67 La CPJI a joint formellement les instances relatives a Certains inte´r^ets allemands en HauteSile´sie polonaise,
au Statut juridique du territoire du sud-est du Gro€enland et aux Appels contre certains jugements du tribunal ar-
bitral mixte hungaro-tche´coslovaque. La CIJ a joint les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain, celles du Plateau contin-
ental de la mer du Nord et les deux affaires relatives a Certaines activite´s mene´es par le Nicaragua dans la
re´gion frontalie`re (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua) et a la Construction d’une route au Costa Rica le long du fleuve
San Juan (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica).
68 Voir Questions d’interpre´tation et d’application de la Convention de Montre´al de 1971 re´sultant de l’incident
ae´rien de Lockerbie.
69 Re´fe´rence explicite a ces principes est faite dans Construction d’une route au Costa Rica le long du fleuve
San Juan (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica), jonction d’instances, ordonnance du 17 avril 2013, C.I.J. Recueil 2013, p.
184, par. 12–18. Le Costa Rica n’avait pas montre´ beaucoup d’enthousiasme pour la de´cision de jonction.
70 Voir Statut juridique du territoire du sud-est du Gro€enland ou le Danemark et la Norve`ge avaient de´pose´
des reque^tes le me^me jour. Voir plus en de´tail D. Akande, «Provisional Measures and Joinder of Cases at
the International Court of Justice — The Answers», EJIL: Talk, 18 janvier 2016, disponible en ligne:
http://www.ejiltalk.org/tag/joinder/.
71 Voir Certaines activite´s mene´es par le Nicaragua dans la re´gion frontalie`re (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua) et a la
Construction d’une route au Costa Rica le long du fleuve San Juan (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica).
72 Voir les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain et du Plateau continental de la mer du Nord.
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La clarification des conditions de jonction en cas de multiplicite´ de demandeurs
ou de de´fendeurs conduirait la Cour a mieux de´finir le concept de «cause com-
mune». Cette clarification serait salutaire pour la pre´servation de l’e´galite´ des parties,
dans la mesure ou les Etats qui font cause commune n’ont pas le droit de nommer
un juge ad hoc si un des membres statutaires de la Cour de´tient la nationalite´ d’un
d’entre eux73. Le proble`me s’e´tait de´ja pose´ dans l’affaire de L’incident ae´rien de
Lockerbie, ou la Cour n’ayant pas joint les instances, «a autorise´ le Royaume-Uni a
de´signer Sir Robert Jennings comme juge ad hoc, alors qu’un juge ame´ricain, l’ancien
pre´sident Schwebel, sie´geait dans l’affaire»74. Cette solution contestable s’e´loignait
partiellement de celle retenue dans le cadre des affaires relatives a la Lice´ite´ de l’emploi
de la force, ou les juges ad hoc des Etats de´fendeurs ont sie´ge´ au stade des mesures
conservatoires, mais pas dans la phase ulte´rieure des exceptions pre´liminaires75.
Un proble`me similaire s’est pose´ dans l’affaire de la Chasse a la baleine: la Cour a
permis a l’Australie de de´signer un juge ad hoc, alors que le sie`ge comportait un juge
de la nationalite´ de la Nouvelle-Ze´lande, en faisant fond sur le postulat que «l’inter-
vention au titre de l’article 63 du Statut . . . ne peut pas compromettre l’e´galite´ entre
les parties au diffe´rend»76. Cette affirmation aurait me´rite´ quelques justifications
supple´mentaires77, d’autant plus que jusqu’ici seules des interventions en tant que
non parties ont e´te´ admises par la Cour, que ce soit sur le fondement de l’article 63
du Statut78 ou sur celui de l’article 62, par. 179. Bien que ce soit la forme la plus habi-
tuelle d’intervention admise par la Cour, l’intervention en tant que non partie
73 Cf. article 31, paragraphe 5, du Statut : «Lorsque plusieurs parties font cause commune, elles ne comp-
tent, pour l’application des dispositions qui pre´ce`dent, que pour une seule.» ; article 36, paragraphe 1, du
Re`glement : «Si la Cour constate que deux ou plusieurs parties font cause commune et doivent donc ne
compter que pour une seule et qu’il n’y a sur le sie`ge aucun membre de la Cour de la nationalite´ de l’une
de ces parties, la Cour leur fixe un de´lai pour de´signer d’un commun accord un juge ad hoc.»
74 A. Ollivier, «Chronique de la Cour internationale de Justice», Revue que´be´coise de droit international,
vol. 16 (2), 2003, p. 237, note 10. Voir aussi Questions d’interpre´tation et d’application de la convention de
Montre´al de 1971 re´sultant de l’incident ae´rien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. RoyaumeUni), ex-
ceptions pre´liminaires, de´claration commune jointe a l’arre^t des juges Bedjaoui, Guillaume et Ranjeva,
C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 3245.
75 Lice´ite´ de l’emploi de la force (Serbie-etMont-e´ne´gro c. Belgique), exceptions pre´liminaires, arr^et,
C.I.J. Recueil 2004 (I), p. 287, par. 18.
76 Chasse a la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon), de´claration d’intervention de la Nouvelle-Ze´lande,
ordonnance du 6 fe´vrier 2013, C.I.J. Recueil 2013, p. 9, par. 18. Le paragraphe 21 de l’ordonnance rejette
d’une manie`re pe´remptoire la possibilite´ de conside´rer le demandeur et l’Etat intervenant comme faisant
cause commune : «21. Conside´rant que la question de la participation a l’affaire du juge ad hoc de´signe´
par l’Australie a e´te´ e´voque´e par le de´fendeur dans le contexte de la discussion par celui-ci de l’e´galite´ des
Parties devant la Cour ; que la Cour estime devoir pre´ciser dans la pre´sente ordonnance que, l’interven-
tion de la Nouvelle-Ze´lande ne lui confe´rant pas la qualite´ de partie au diffe´rend, l’Australie et la
Nouvelle-Ze´lande ne sauraient e^tre conside´re´es comme des «parties [faisant] cause commune» au sens
du paragraphe 5 de l’article 31 du Statut ; que, en conse´quence, la pre´sence sur le sie`ge d’un juge de la
nationalite´ de l’Etat intervenant est sans incidence sur le droit du juge ad hoc de´signe´ par le demandeur
de sie´ger en l’affaire conforme´ment au paragraphe 2 de l’article 31 du Statut.»
77 Voir de´claration de M. le juge Owada, Chasse a la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon), de´claration
d’intervention de la Nouvelle-Ze´lande, ordonnance du 6 fe´vrier 2013, C.I.J. Recueil 2013, p. 11–12, par. 1 et 3.
78 La Pologne dans l’affaire du Vapeur Wimbledon, Cuba dans l’affaire Haya de la Torre et la Nouvelle-
Ze´lande dans l’affaire de la Chasse a la baleine dans l’Antarctique.
79 La Guine´e e´quatoriale dans l’affaire de la Frontie`re terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nige´ria
(Cameroun c. Nige´ria) et Gre`ce dans l’affaire relative aux Immunite´s juridictionnelles de l’Etat (Allemagne c.
Italie).
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continue a soulever plusieurs difficulte´s, dans la mesure ou l’Etat intervenant ne be´n-
e´ficie pas moins de certains droits proce´duraux.
Ainsi, l’intervention affecte indirectement la composition de l’instance de juge-
ment. En effet, si la Nouvelle-Ze´lande e´tait intervenue en tant que partie, l’Australie
aurait perdu son droit de de´signer un juge ad hoc. Pour reprendre l’analyse du juge
Guillaume, bien que les «textes . . . reconnaissent (. . .) aux Etats un droit de
de´signer un juge [. . .], ce droit proce`de d’un principe encore plus fondamental, celui
d’e´galite´ des parties. Or dans certains cas cette e´galite´ peut e^tre rompue du fait de la
de´signation d’un juge ad hoc. Il en est ainsi lorsqu’un Etat faisant cause commune
avec d’autres a de´ja un juge sur le sie`ge. En pareille hypothe`se, le droit statutaire a la
de´signation d’un juge ad hoc perd son fondement et le principe d’e´galite´ exige qu’un
tel juge ne soit pas de´signe´»80.
L’intervention affecte e´galement le de´roulement du proce`s: en effet, en l’e´tat
actuel du droit, le de´lai pour l’introduction d’une demande d’intervention fonde´e sur
l’article 62 court jusqu’a «la cloˆture de la proce´dure e´crite»81, tandis que pour celle
fonde´e l’article 63, il court jusqu’a «la date fixe´e pour l’ouverture de la proce´dure
orale»82. Si les demandes d’intervention sont de´pose´es a un stade avance´ de la pro-
ce´dure — et c’est souvent le cas — elles perturbent le de´roulement de celle-ci, car
les Etats doivent adapter leur argumentaire a celui de l’intervenant, et ils doivent sou-
vent le faire dans la pre´cipitation. En outre, le temps de parole de l’Etat intervenant
vient s’ajouter a celui des parties, qui est lui divise´ en parts e´gales, alors que les the`ses
de l’Etat intervenant se rapprochent tre`s souvent de celles de l’une d’entre elles.
L’ide´e n’est pas de restreindre cette forme d’acce`s a la Cour, mais d’en pre´ciser les
modalite´s proce´durales de telle manie`re que l’e´galite´ entre les parties puisse e^tre pre´-
serve´e au mieux. La Cour doit y veiller encore plus scrupuleusement
lorsqu’elle tranche la recevabilite´ des demandes en intervention uniquement sur
la base des e´changes e´crits83. Une rede´finition du concept de «cause commune» et
un encadrement temporel plus strict de l’intervention permettraient d’atteindre cet
objectif.
I I I . LA RE´PE´TITION DES FRAIS COMME MESURE DE BONNE
ADMINISTRATION DE LA JUSTICE?
En dehors des mesures proce´durales, quelles autres solutions la Cour pourrait-elle
mettre en œuvre pour assurer la bonne administration de la justice? La re´pe´tition des
frais est une alternative parfois e´voque´e, tout en sachant que, dans le contentieux in-
tere´tatique, le principe selon lequel chaque partie supporte ses frais de
80 G. Guillaume, «La «cause commune» devant la Cour internationale de Justice», in Liber amicorum judge
Mohammed Bedjaoui, reproduit dans La Cour internationale de Justice a l’aube du XXIe`me sie`cle. Le regard
d’un juge, Pedone, 2003, p. 140.
81 Article 81, paragraphe 1, du Re`glement.
82 Article 82, paragraphe 1, du Re`glement.
83 En effet, la Cour n’a pas tenu d’audiences consacre´es a la question de la recevabilite´ des interventions ni
dans Immunite´s juridictionnelles de l’Etat, ni dans Chasse a la baleine dans l’Antarctique. Sur ce point, voir
aussi Immunite´s juridictionnelles de l’Etat (Allemagne c. Italie ; Gre`ce (intervenant)), ordonnance du 6 juil-
let 2010, de´claration de M. le juge ad hoc Gaja, C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (I), p. 398.
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proce´dure demeure bien ancre´84. Ni la CIJ ni le TIDM ne s’en sont jusqu’a pre´sent
e´carte´s85.
L’affaire du Navire «Saiga» devant le TIDM est symptomatique de l’extre^me re´ti-
cence du juge international a acce´der aux demandes de re´pe´tition des frais. En
l’espe`ce le compromis a la base de la saisine du TIDM pre´voyait que «le Tribunal
international du droit de la mer examinera toutes les demandes en dommages et
inte´re^ts et en remboursement des de´penses (. . .) et il sera habilite´ a rendre une de´ci-
sion concernant la charge des frais de justice et autres de´pens encourus par la partie
a laquelle il donnera gain de cause»86. Le Tribunal n’en a pas moins conside´re´ qu’il
n’avait «pas de raison de s’e´carter de la re`gle ge´ne´rale selon laquelle chaque partie
supporte ses frais de proce´dure»87. Cette affaire tend a de´montrer que la re`gle de
re´partition des frais est une re`gle statutaire ou un principe ge´ne´ral du contentieux in-
ter-e´tatique, dont les parties ne sauraient disposer, fu^t-ce par voie d’accord.
Certes, la Cour comme le TIDM se sont re´serve´ la possibilite´ de faire droit a des
demandes de re´pe´tition, s’ils estimaient qu’une telle de´cision serait approprie´e dans
les circonstances de l’affaire. Mais faute de de´cision positive, la jurisprudence inter-
e´tatique reste discre`te sur la nature de ces circonstances.
Une premie`re hypothe`se serait celle de l’abus de proce´dure: c’est du moins ce qui
ressort indirectement de l’argumentaire des Etats. Ils ont demande´ la re´pe´tition des
frais lorsqu’ils estimaient que l’autre partie a engage´ une proce´dure qu’elle savait
voue´e a l’e´chec88. La deuxie`me hypothe`se est celle des violations de´libe´re´es d’une
84 Voir article 64 du Statut de la CIJ ; article 34 du Statut du TIDM ; article 40, paragraphe 1, du Re`glement
facultatif de la CPA pour l’arbitrage des diffe´rends entre deux Etats. Dans Demande de re´formation du juge-
ment no 158 du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies, la Cour internationale de Justice avait qualifie´
cette re`gle de «principe fondamental en matie`re de de´pens qui s’applique au contentieux devant les tribu-
naux internationaux» (avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 212, par. 98).
85 Voir aussi Application de la convention pour la pre´vention et la re´pression du crime de ge´nocide
(BosnieHerze´govine c. Yougoslavie), exceptions pre´liminaires, arr^et, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 622, par. 46 ;
Demande en interpre´tation de l’arr^et du 11 juin 1998 en l’affaire de la Frontie`re terrestre et maritime entre
le Cameroun et le Nige´ria (Cameroun c. Nige´ria), exceptions pre´liminaires (Nige´ria c. Cameroun), arr^et,
C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (I), p. 39-40, par. 18 ; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Re´publique de Guine´e c. Re´publique de´mo-
cratique du Congo), indemnisation, arr^et, C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (I), p. 344, par. 58–60 ; Construction d’une route
au Costa Rica le long du fleuve San Juan (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica) ; Instance jointe a Certaines activite´s
mene´es par le Nicaragua dans la re´gion frontalie`re (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua), arre^t du 16 de´cembre 2015,
par. 143–144.
Du coˆte´ du TDIM : arre^t, 1er juillet 1999, Affaire du navire «SAIGA» (No 2) (Saint-Vincent-et-les
Grenadines c. Guine´e), par. 88–89 ; ordonnance, 3 de´cembre 2001, Affaire de l’Usine MOX (Irlande c.
Royaume–Uni), mesures conservatoires, par. 88 ; ordonnance, 8 octobre 2003, Affaire relative aux trav-
aux de polde´risation par Singapour a l’inte´rieur et a proximite´ du de´troit de Johor (Malaisie c. Singapour),
mesures conservatoires, par. 105–106 ; arre^t du 18 de´cembre 2004, Affaire du «Juno Trader» (Saint-
Vincent-et-les Grenadines c. Guine´e-Bissau), prompte mainleve´e, par. 103–104 ; arre^t, 28 mai 2013, Affaire
du navire «Louisa» (Saint-Vincent-et-les Grenadines c. Royaume d’Espagne), par. 156–159.
86 TIDM, Affaire du navire «SAIGA» (No 2), Notification du compromis, 20 fe´vrier 1998, point 4.
87 ibid par. 182. Voir e´galement la de´claration, longuement e´taye´e, des juges ayant vote´ contre le point du
dispositif relatif aux frais (de´claration pre´sente´e a titre collectif par MM. Caminos, Yankov, Akl,
Anderson, Vukas, Treves et Eiriksson sur la question des frais de proce´dure).
88 Application de la convention pour la pre´vention et la re´pression du crime de ge´nocide (Bosnie-Herze´govine
c. Yougoslavie), exceptions pre´liminaires, arr^et, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 622, par. 46. Voir aussi Demande en
interpre´tation de l’arr^et du 11 juin 1998 en l’affaire de la Frontie`re terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun
et le Nige´ria, note 85 ci-dessus ; Sentence, 18 mars 2015, Arbitrage relatif a l’aire marine prote´ge´e des
Chagos (Maurice c. Royaume-Uni), par. 546 ; Sentence, 20 janvier 2008, La Re´publique d’Italie c. La
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de´cision de la Cour, qui porteraient atteinte a l’inte´grite´ du processus judiciaire. Elle
a e´te´ mise en exergue par la de´cision re´cente dans les affaires jointes Costa Rica c.
Nicaragua, dans laquelle la Cour, bien qu’elle eu^t constate´ que «en ne respectant pas
les prescriptions de l’ordonnance de 2011, le Nicaragua [a] conduit le Costa Rica a
engager une nouvelle proce´dure en indication de mesures conservatoires»89, elle a
ne´anmoins refuse´ d’acce´der a la demande de re´pe´tition des frais ainsi engage´s. Une
minorite´ non ne´gligeable de la Cour a exprime´ son de´saccord avec cette solution, au
motif que:
«The power to indicate provisional measures is of the utmost importance for the
maintenance of the integrity of proceedings before the Court (. . .). The Court, and
those States appearing before it, are entitled to assume that a State litigating in
good faith will be scrupulous in complying with those measures. If its failure to do so
necessitates a further hearing, it is only right that that State should bear the costs
incurred.»90
Loin d’^etre une question anodine et purement financie`re, le refus des juridictions
internationales d’acce´der aux demandes de re´pe´tition des frais met en e´vidence cer-
taines des particularite´s du contentieux intere´tatique. D’abord, par contraste avec l’ar-
bitrage d’investissement: dans ce cadre, la re´pe´tition des frais est conside´re´e comme
un droit accessoire de la partie gagnante91, les arbitres se re´servant simplement le
droit d’appre´cier le montant attribue´ a la lumie`re du succe`s sur le fond et du com-
portement des parties92. Dans le contentieux intere´tatique, une de´cision de re´pe´tition
des frais reviendrait a de´signer ostensiblement un perdant et un gagnant93, et cette
appre´ciation cadrerait mal avec la vocation premie`re du juge intere´tatique, qui est de
pacifier les relations entre les Etats.
On peut e´galement voir a l’œuvre la re´ticence habituelle du juge international a
de´clarer qu’un Etat souverain a agi de mauvaise foi (dont l’abus du droit n’est qu’un
Re´publique de Cuba, par. 256, disponible en ligne : http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu
ments/ita0435_0.pdf, consulte´ le 15 mars 2016.
89 Certaines activite´s mene´es par le Nicaragua dans la re´gion frontalie`re (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua) ;Construction
d’une route au Costa Rica le long du fleuve San Juan (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica), arre^t du 16 de´cembre 2015,
par. 144.
90 Ibid., de´claration commune de MM. les juges Tomka et Greenwood, Mme la juge Sebutinde et
M. le juge ad hoc Dugard, par. 8.
91 I. Uchkunova, «Allocation of Costs in ICSID Arbitration», 3 de´cembre 2014, disponible en ligne a
l’adresse: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/12/03/allocation-of-costs-in-icsid-arbitration/,
consulte´ le 15 mars 2016. Voir aussi D. Caron et L. Caplan, «The Costs of Arbitration», in The
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. A Commentary, OUP, 2e e´d., 2013, p. 839–905.
92 Voir la discussion tre`s inte´ressante sur les principes guidant cette appre´ciation, dans la sentence CIRDI
du 4 aou^t 2010, Foresti and other v. Republic of South Africa (no ARB(AF)/07/1), par. 107–140 ; ou dans
celle du 8 octobre 2009, EDF Services c. Roumanie, par. 321–328, disponible en ligne a l’adresse: http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0267.pdf, ainsi que, dans la me^me affaire, l’opin-
ion dissidente de l’arbitre A. Rovine au sujet de la re´partition des cou^ts : http://www.italaw.com/sites/de
fault/files/case-documents/ita0266.pdf, consulte´ le 15 mars 2016.
93 Shabtai Rosenne rappelait «the classic theory of international arbitration and the principle of the equality of
the parties, according to which it is not appropriate to regard the parties as standing in some sort of plaintiff/de-
fendant relationship» (Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice, Brill/Nijhoff, 2006, vol. III, p.
1314–1315, voir aussi ibid., p. 1240–1245).
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autre nom)94 ou encore qu’il a engage´ des proce´dures frivoles. La re´pe´tition des frais
dans cette hypothe`se soule`verait plus de proble`mes qu’elle n’apporterait de solu-
tions: on pense en premier lieu au risque de de´courager les Etats a engager des pro-
ce´dures unilate´rales lorsqu’ils doutent de la solidite´ de la base de compe´tence
invoque´e. De ce point de vue, la re´pe´tition des frais au stade des exceptions pre´limin-
aires n’est finalement pas une re´elle alternative aux de´cisions d’incompe´tence mani-
feste adopte´es de`s la phase des mesures conservatoires95. Surtout, dans des
circonstances factuelles comme celles de la Lice´ite´ de l’emploi de la force ou de la
Re´publique de´mocratique du Congo c. Rwanda, il est politiquement difficile pour la
Cour de de´clarer les reque^tes frivoles ou abusives96. A la diffe´rence du juge interne
ou de l’arbitre dans le contentieux mixte, l’office du juge intere´tatique rele`ve e´gale-
ment de la diplomatie.
EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION
La pratique des dix dernie`res anne´es en matie`re de me´thodes de travail montre une
Cour de plus en plus directive dans la conduite du proce`s. Les initiatives re´centes
ont e´te´ ge´ne´ralement bien accueillies, des re´serves s’e´tant exprime´es uniquement
lorsque la Cour est alle´e au-dela du Re`glement ou s’est montre´e trop accommodante
avec la violation des standards qu’elle a elle-me^me e´tablis — c’est particulie`rement
perceptible pour les Instructions de proce´dure. Quelles propositions de re´forme
pourrait-on avancer?
La Cour manifeste une faible appe´tence pour la re´vision du Re`glement97 ou de la
Re´solution visant la pratique en matie`re judiciaire98, sans doute par confiance dans la
tradition. En outre, le dicton Mavrommatis, selon lequel la Cour «n’est pas tenue
d’attacher a des conside´rations de forme la me^me importance qu’elles pourraient
avoir dans le droit interne»99 garde une vigueur particulie`re devant la CIJ aussi100.
Aux re´visons formelles la Cour pre´fe`re les ajustements jurisprudentiels. Ceux-ci sont
peut-^etre efficaces a long terme, mais ils ont le de´savantage de ne pas produire des
effets imme´diats et d’^etre influence´s par les circonstances particulie`res des affaires
dans lesquels ils sont rendus.
Mais lorsque certains proble`mes sont devenus re´currents — comme par exemple
le droit de nommer un juge ad hoc dans les affaires ou plusieurs Etats font cause
94 Cf. Certaines terres a phosphates a Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), exceptions pre´liminaires, arr^et,
C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 255, par. 38.
95 Voir supra, Section I (2).
96 Pour d’autres avis allant dans le me^me sens, voir ceux cite´s dans A. Miron, «Le cou^t de la justice interna-
tionale. Enque^te sur les aspects financiers du contentieux intere´tatique», Annuaire franc¸ais du droit inter-
nationale, vol. LX, p. 22–24.
97 Le Re`glement n’a connu qu’une re´vision majeure en 1978 et des re´visions ponctuelles en 1972, 2000 et
2005.
98 La Re´solution visant la pratique de la Cour en matie`re judiciaire a e´te´ adopte´e le 12 avril 1976 et n’a
jamais e´te´ re´vise´e depuis.
99 Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, arr^et no 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. se´rie A no 2, p. 34.
100 Voir notamment Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun c. Royaume-Uni), exceptions pre´liminaires, arr^et,
C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 28 ; Certaines terres a phosphates a Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), exceptions pre´limin-
aires, arr^et, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 265, par. 65 ; Application de la convention pour la pre´vention et la re´pres-
sion du crime de ge´nocide (Croatie c. Serbie), exceptions pre´liminaires, arr^et, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 439,
par. 82.
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commune — la re´vision du Re`glement s’impose comme une meilleure solution, car
elle mettrait de l’ordre dans les solutions et renforcerait la pre´visibilite´ du de´roule-
ment du proce`s. Pour des Etats qui se retrouvent pour la premie`re fois devant la
Cour, c’est important. Vu le peu d’e´gards manifeste´s par les Etats pour le respect des
instructions de proce´dure, on peut en outre se demander si certaines d’entre elles ne
me´riteraient pas d’^etre hisse´es au rang de droit dur et d’^etre inte´gre´es dans le
Re`glement.
La bonne administration de la justice intere´tatique requiert un savant dosage de
tradition et d’innovation, de solennite´ et de pragmatisme. La Cour a fait preuve de
pragmatisme en abandonnant la posture de de´fe´rence e´blouie a l’e´gard des Etats et
en reprenant la main sur de nombreux aspects du de´roulement du proce`s. Elle a
ne´anmoins tenu a pre´server la solennite´ — pas seulement a travers le ce´re´monial du
proce`s ou la re´novation du Grand Hall dans l’esprit de la tradition, mais aussi dans la
conduite de la proce´dure. Apaiser autant que possible l’atmosphe`re entre les parties,
montrer de la conside´ration a l’e´gard de l’Etat (me^me perdant), cela aussi fait partie
de la bonne administration de la justice intere´tatique. Mais la Cour ne pourrait y par-
venir sans le concours des parties et de leurs conseils, qui doivent s’astreindre a des
re`gles e´thiques strictes101.
De´cide´ment, les Etats ne sont pas des justiciables de droit commun. Et un proce`s
devant la Cour internationale de Justice n’est jamais banal: c’est sans doute pour cela
qu’on l’appelle la Cour.
101 Sienho YEE (ILA Study Group), UN Reform through Practice Report, 2011, p. 62–74, disponible en ligne
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/study_groups.cfm/cid/0, consulte´ le 15 mars 2016.
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